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Abstract 
Located between sub-Saharan Africa and southern Europe on the edge of the 
Mediterranean the country of Algeria has experienced the challenges of a transit state 
in attempting to prevent irregular migration through its territory. The question guiding 
this research aimed to explore the conditions under which and with what regard to 
sovereignty do countries that experience extensive through-migration adopt global 
governance norms and implement policies which contribute to the broader 
international goals of safe, orderly and regular migration. This research project 
examines findings from an expert survey which indicate that, despite a strong 
sovereignty ethic, Algeria approaches irregular migration governance from a 
domestic security angle with a priority on maintaining public order and satisfaction. 
Furthermore, findings from a policy assessment based on the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) 
revealed the causes for such an approach to be based more a lack of internal 
consistency rather than deliberate sovereignty assertion in response to external 
pressure. 
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Introduction 
 
Challenges exist for countries that experience unregulated inflows of 
migrants. The inability of governments to effectively and fairly manage entry can 
lead to localized overpopulation, inadequate infrastructure, community tension and in 
some cases bigotry and violence. Risks to migrants entering a country without legal 
documentation can be severe as they are faced with low-skilled work,1 limited or 
nonexistent service provision in host countries,2 and victimization due to their 
irregular entry or other status. In short, the tension over irregular migration touches 
host nation communities, origin country economies, host nation governments and 
migrants themselves.  
 
                                                 
1 Sylvie Bredeloup, “Sahara Transit: Times, Spaces, People,” Population, Space and Place 18, no. 4 (October 2010): 464, 
https://doi-org.du.idm.oclc.org/10.1002/psp.634. 
2 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Chapter 7: Migration, social polarization, citizenship 
and multiculturalism (Global State of Democracy, First Edition, 2017): 202, accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.idea.int/gsod/.  
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Despite the slow in migration after the peak of Europe’s ‘migrant crisis’ in 
2015, transit through the Euro-med remains an urgent policy issue. Migration is 
predicted by high profile leaders of the EU to have the potential to impact the fate of 
the European Union.3 Irregular migration across the Mediterranean from North Africa 
to southern Europe has received significant media attention since it was first termed a 
‘crisis’ in 2015.4 As a result, intra-European discussions on sharing the burdens of the 
influx of migrants has highlighted internal tensions between EU members, and 
external tension with southern neighbors. Despite programs which encourage cross-
cutting initiatives between Europe and North Africa, agreements on the processing of 
migrants both before and after reaching European shores remains a point of concern.5 
Just as important, indecisive, contradictory and competitive policies have driven 
irregular migrants to take more drastic risks on their long journeys, highlighting the 
human security crisis which so often is juxtaposed against that of state security.  
 
It remains to be fully explored the conditions under which and with what 
regard to sovereignty do countries that experience extensive through-migration adopt 
                                                 
3 “European Leaders Claim Breakthrough Deal on Migration after Marathon Talks,” Associated Press in NBC News, June 29, 
2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/european-leaders-claim-breakthrough-deal-migration-after-marathon-talks-
n887676. 
4 “Migrant Crisis: One Million Enter Europe in 2015.” BBC, December 22, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
35158769. 
5 ICMPD, “EUROMED Migration IV,” accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migration-dialogues/euromed-
migration-iv/. 
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global governance norms and implement policies that contribute to the broader 
international goals of safe, orderly and regular migration. 
 
Global governance regimes utilize shared norms, markets, and laws to 
encourage collective activity, and migration governance regimes are no exception.6 
Despite strong success, gaps in collaborative migration governance regimes remain, 
challenged by non-cooperation and unilateral policymaking. Some see the drive to 
conduct unilateral migration policy as stemming from a strong ethic of state 
sovereignty, poor international migration governance coordination, and poor 
enforcement mechanisms.7 Cooperation between countries experiencing migration 
tensions is the norm but political disagreements about what should be done with 
irregular travelers are becoming more common, especially regarding travelers who do 
not fit neatly into predetermined categories.  
 
At the same time, the rights of sovereign states are under pressure. 
International migration governance regimes require commitment and follow-through 
from independent states which can be perceived to contradict national territorial law. 
Indeed, the securitization of migration and particularly irregular migration can be 
                                                 
6 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and P. J. Simmons. Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, 2001), 14, https://search-ebscohost-
com.du.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=522598&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
7 Khalid Koser, “Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance,” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 
302, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29764947. 
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viewed as a platform for sovereignty assertion.8 While such regimes look to balance 
the safeguarding of vulnerable travelers with the right of sovereign states to govern 
their territories, policies generally target origin (sending) and destination (receiving) 
countries in attempts to forge solutions. Transit country cooperation is equally 
important but particularly challenging as migrants neither originate from nor intend to 
settle in the transit country.  
 
Unfortunately, supranational migration governance regimes face policy 
dilemmas as they struggle to overcome the incongruity between territorial sovereignty 
and humanitarian rights with regard to irregular cross-border movement. The 
consequences of these failings can be seen in a lack of cooperation among nations, an 
inability to accurately measure and assess irregular migration, and a long-term lack of 
input and buy-in from transit states along migration chains resulting in the 
preventable loss of human life. This gap can be attributed to poor understanding of 
the deep-rooted nature of sovereignty, incomplete or ill-fitting assessment tools and a 
focus on only two of three country categories along migration chains. Specifically, 
few studies have looked to address the impact of notions of state sovereignty as it 
relates to irregular migration governance within transit states.  
 
                                                 
8 Gregory White, “Sovereignty and International Labor Migration: The 'Security Mentality' in Spanish-Moroccan Relations as 
an Assertion of Sovereignty,” Review of International Political Economy 14, no. 4 (October 2007): 690, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25261935. 
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In seeking to understand the conditions under which and with what regard to 
sovereignty do countries that experience extensive through-migration adopt global 
governance norms and implement policies that contribute to the broader international 
goals of safe, orderly and regular migration, this research undertook a deep migration 
policy assessment coupled with an expert survey.  
 
The purpose of this study was to conduct a policy assessment of irregular 
migration governance in one transit country with the goal of exploring the degree to 
which notions of state sovereignty impact that country’s approach irregular migration 
and how it engages with international migration governance regimes. This irregular 
migration assessment was conducted under the following premises, that: 
 
 Irregular migration matters as a distinct area of study 
 State sovereignty is key to the irregular migration discussion 
 The Euro-Med route provides a unique backdrop to understand State-State 
pressure 
 Algeria, thanks to its unique blend of regional cooperation and rejection of 
Western interference, provides a key starting point to understand North-South 
pressures in light of increased irregular migration in the region. 
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Addressing sovereignty concerns with transit countries will increase the 
ability of policymakers to integrate incentives for cooperation and enhance 
coordination among all states along long migration chains, leading to safe, orderly, 
and regular migration. When supranational organizations add nuance to their 
understanding of the nexus of irregular migration and state sovereignty, they will be 
better positioned to increase cooperation, reduce fence-building, and craft solutions 
that work for all states along migration chains. 
 
Transit states may decline regional migration governance mechanisms in 
favor of maintaining strict territorial sovereignty if they face pressure from 
neighboring destination countries.9 International migration law itself is being 
reinfused with concepts of sovereignty in an era where this concept is challenged by 
globalization.10 The Global Compact for Migration is the most salient migration 
governance mechanism pertaining to irregular migration, representing strong 
international norms which states may or may not adhere to. This guided the 
conceptual orientations which led to the formation of the research question: 
 
                                                 
9 Tasnim Abderrahim, “Pushing the Boundaries: How to Create More Effective Migration Cooperation Across the 
Mediterranean,” European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), January 15, 2019, 
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/pushing_the_boundaries_effective_migration_cooperation_across_Mediterranean. 
European Council on Foreign Relations. 
10 Catherine Dauvergne, “Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times,” The Modern Law Review 67, no. 4 
(July 2004): 588-615. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2230.2004.00501.x. 
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Under what conditions and with what regard to sovereignty do countries that 
experience extensive through-migration adopt global governance norms and 
implement policies that contribute to the broader international goals of safe, orderly 
and regular migration? 
 
The roadmap for this study is as follows:  
 Section 1 will explore the conceptual orientations and context which highlight 
the importance of state sovereignty and transit states. 
 Section 2 will present Algeria as the case study, caught between irregular 
migration pressure from the south (sub-Saharan Africa) and migration 
governance pressure from the north (EU). 
 Section 3 will present the IOM Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) 
as the model for conducting the policy assessment. 
 Section 4 will summarize the findings of the study. 
 Section 5 will discuss implications and recommendations for Algeria in 
particular and transit states more broadly with regard to future policy 
development. 
 
Findings from an expert survey indicate that, despite a strong sovereignty 
ethic as evidenced in strict non-interventionism, Algeria approaches irregular 
migration governance from a domestic security angle with a priority on maintaining 
public order and satisfaction. Furthermore, findings from a policy assessment based 
  
8 
 
on the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Migration Governance 
Framework (MiGOF) revealed the causes for such an approach to be a lack of internal 
political will and consistency rather than deliberate sovereignty assertion in response 
to external pressure. Contrary to expected findings, this reveals a more nuanced 
approach to migration on the part of the Algerian government which may value some 
forms of sovereignty over others. 
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Chapter One | Context and Conceptual Orientations 
 
“The creation of a more or less formal set of norms and rules to regulate 
the behavior of States with respect to the movement of people across 
borders and to begin taking concrete actions in pursuit of a shared 
agenda of safe, secure, legal, and orderly migration” - Migration Policy 
Institute (MPI)11 
 
Focus has grown on the importance of migration and its effects globally, with 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development referencing migration in 6 of its 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).12 Migration governance is highly policy-
                                                 
11 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Measuring well-governed migration: The 2016 Migration Governance Index (International 
Organization for Migration, 2016): 12, accessed May 16, 2019, http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/EIU-Migration-
Governance-Index-20160429.pdf. 
12 "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," International Organization for Migration (IOM), (IOM Office to the United 
Nations, New York 2018), accessed August 7, 2018, https://unofficeny.iom.int/2030-agenda-sustainable-development. 
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relevant and will increasingly be so as the world braces for increased cross-border 
migration13 as the gap between the rich and poor continues to widen.14 
 
Regimes may be regional in nature or span the globe as countries collaborate 
to manage legal channels to work, live, and obtain citizenship outside their country of 
birth. International regimes are not necessarily neutral and can warp to suit the needs 
and priorities of the powerful.15 Mass irregular migration, whether over a prolonged 
or concentrated period of time can have significant impacts upon affected countries 
all along migration chains. 
 
With stakeholders around the table opposed on grounds of security and 
humanitarian concerns regarding irregular migration, it is no wonder that coherent 
policy is hard to deliver.16 Designed to balance the rights of the most vulnerable and 
the interests of diverse nations with unique goals, migration governance regimes often 
struggles to bridge this ideological gap. How states engage with migration 
governance regimes may indicate their positionality on these two points as they have 
                                                 
13 “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” National Intelligence Council, (December 2012), iv, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf. 
14 Evie Browne, Drivers of irregular migration in North Africa, (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1271, 2015), 6, 
Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, accessed May 14, 2019, http://gsdrc.org/publications/drivers-of-
irregular-migration-in-north-africa.  
15 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and P. J. Simmons. Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, 2001), 15. https://search-ebscohost-
com.du.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=522598&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
16 Khalid Koser, International Migration A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 57. 
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the responsibility of balancing demands from constituents as well as the international 
community. The creation of migration policy at the individual state level is often done 
with consultation from the international community and broader migration 
governance regimes. It is at this point where states must determine how to balance 
their national sovereignty priorities with international cooperation. 
 
How migration governance is implemented can impact human security as well 
as national security. International migration governance organizations like the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and others promote human security 
as a natural outcome of shared migration governance and assume that states which 
adopt global norms will be less likely to violate basic human rights. Unsuccessful 
outcomes of migration governance in destination countries include poor integration, 
political opposition from host nation communities to newcomers, discrimination and 
violence, bureaucratic hurdles to employment, and ultimate distrust between migrant 
communities and host nation communities. Likewise, non-cooperation and rejection 
of global norms can result in poor human security outcomes for migrants. Poorly 
managed border control systems have negative consequences for national citizens as 
well as undocumented migrants.17  
 
                                                 
17 Sabine Dini, “Migration Management, Capacity Building and the Sovereignty of an African State: International Organization 
for Migration in Djibouti,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 10 (2018): 1702, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354058. 
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Irregular migration as a term encapsulates those who enter a state territory 
without legal documentation, or who enter legally but overstay their visa and find 
themselves in an irregular situation. The distinctions between those who intentionally 
enter a territory with forged papers, those who enter with no documentation but for 
humanitarian reasons, and those who enter and work legally but overstay their visas 
have become blurred.18 Here the term ‘irregular’ is used in place of ‘illegal’ or 
‘undocumented’ because it allows for the inclusion of multiple forms of irregular 
cross-border entry including forced migration (refugees and asylum-seekers) and 
economic migration and because it upholds the dignity of both migrants and the state 
territories they enter. 
 
 
1.1 Sovereignty as a Barrier to Participation 
 
“Europe has many challenges, but that of migration could determine 
the fate of the European Union” - German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
to lawmakers before migration summit in Brussels in June, 201819 
 
                                                 
18 Koser, A Very Short Introduction, 17 and 49. 
19 “European Leaders Claim Breakthrough Deal on Migration after Marathon Talks,” Associated Press in NBC News, June 29, 
2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/european-leaders-claim-breakthrough-deal-migration-after-marathon-talks-
n887676. 
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“… it is becoming increasingly counterintuitive that states continue on 
a unilateral basis to try to govern a process that is by definition 
transnational…” - Khalid Koser 20 
 
Adopting a pragmatic view of irregular migration will reveal that transit 
states, like individuals, are rational actors who choose to act and cooperate in their 
own self-interest. On the state level, numbers of individuals crossing international 
borders irregularly matter for service provision and ultimately human security. What 
may matter more is how irregular migration is perceived to challenge state 
sovereignty regardless of the degree to which such movement truly impacts state 
capacity. The purpose of this study was not to validate or invalidate state perceptions 
of threatened sovereignty, but to acknowledge these perceptions as reality-framing, 
and thus deserving of a valid response.  
 
Stephen D. Krasner defines four subcategories of state sovereignty, 
interdependence, Westphalian, international legal, and domestic.21 This study focused 
specifically on two elements of sovereignty, interdependence and Westphalian 
sovereignty, while shelving domestic and international legal sovereignty. 
Interdependence sovereignty pertains to “the ability of a government to regulate the 
                                                 
20 Koser, “Introduction: International Migration,” 304. 
21 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9. 
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movement of goods, capital, people and ideas across its borders.”22 The underlying 
attribute of interdependence sovereignty is control and the capacity of states to 
manage their territorial borders. Globalization inherently ‘escalates interdependence’, 
making it more challenging for states to manage the transnational flows across its 
borders.23 Ultimately, interdependence sovereignty refers to territorial sovereignty. 
Westphalian sovereignty highlights the fundamental aspect of state autonomy and has 
come to be known as the right of states to manage their territory and internal political 
institutions without the intervention or influence of external actors.24 This type of 
sovereignty implies the ability to create and implement policy, including that of 
border control, without undue influence from outside forces.  
For this study, the subcategories of domestic and international legal 
sovereignty were excluded under the assumption that the states under examination 
(transit states) are recognized by the international community as defined by 
international legal sovereignty.25 Furthermore, addressing the nature of government 
authority within states as defined by domestic sovereignty was beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
                                                 
22 Stephen D. Krasner, “Problematic Sovereignty,” in Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, ed. 
Stephen D. Krasner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/kras12178.5. 
23 Jonge Oudraat and Simmons, Managing Global Issues, 14. 
24 Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, 20. 
25 Tanja E. Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Sovereignty at Sea: The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in the Mare 
Liberum,” Journal of International Relations and Development 17, no. 4 (September 2014): 
443, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jird.2014.12.   
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Migration governance regimes are the epitome of international cooperation 
mechanisms, with states themselves as the primary actors.26 International migration 
governance regimes affirm that state sovereignty is the base upon which regional 
cooperation is built,27 with the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration recognizing the importance of state-led initiatives to address irregular 
migration.28 Though the features of sovereignty are never completely adhered to,29 an 
international state sovereignty perspective can help us identify the internal and 
external pressures upon the state players in migration policy and practice. 
 
Critics of a state-sovereignty approach to irregular migration point out that 
actual numbers quantifying irregular migration are quite small or only estimates, 
posing no real overwhelming threat to states. Estimates are that roughly 50% of 
migration takes place irregularly worldwide and most of that regionally; only 10% of 
Europe’s migrants are believed to be in an irregular situation.30 Even this does not 
prove that they entered irregularly but may have overstayed their visa or become 
                                                 
26 Khalid Koser, “Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance,” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 
302, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29764947.  
27 Rabat Process: Euro-African Dialoque on Migration and Development, Marrakesh Political Declaration, May 2, 2018 in  
Marrakesh, Morocco, accessed August 7, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/20180503_declaration-
and-action-plan-marrakesh_en.pdf. 
28 “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Intergovernmentally Negotiated and Agreed Outcome,” July 13, 
2018, accessed May 19, 2019 from UN Refugees and Migrants: Compact For Migration. 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713_agreed_outcome_global_compact_for_migration.pdf. ¶ 47. 
29 Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, 11-24. 
30 Koser, A Very Short Introduction, 52. 
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irregular another way, highlighting the politicization of the issue which focuses 
heavily on irregular cross-border entry. Furthermore, many see the irregular migration 
discussion already heavily dominated by state-centric rhetoric and advocate for a 
more humanitarian lens through which to understand the complex topic. While a 
rights-based approach is vital to ensuring human security along irregular migration 
chains, depending upon it may backfire. This could be responsible in part for the rise 
of Western leaders from 2015 – 2018 who, while formerly committed to the rights-
based liberal order including migration governance regimes, vowed to defend their 
countries’ sovereignty and national self-interest in the face of heightened migratory 
pressure. Europe’s ‘migrant crisis’ and the backlash it incited proves that liberalism 
does not contain “the seeds of its own salvation”.31 Rather, focusing on the wellbeing 
and rights of migrants to the detriment of the rights of the states they pass through 
will result in even more antagonistic views toward a humanitarian approach.  
 
Cooperation between states is a key feature of all governance regimes that 
seek to address complex problems in a comprehensive manner. In an era of 
globalization, states may be seen as ‘civilization units’ seeking maximum levels of 
autonomy while reaping the benefits of selective participation in various levels of 
international integration and governance via globalization.32 Ultimately, states will 
                                                 
31 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (July 2018): 18, 
https://search-proquest-com.du.idm.oclc.org/docview/2058267013?accountid=14608. 
32 Rosemary Sales, Understanding Immigration and Refugee Policy: Contradictions and Continuities (Bristol: Policy Press, 
2007), 106. 
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make choices based on their own self-interest (law of consequences) rather than 
prevailing international norms (the law of appropriateness).33 Like individuals, state 
governments make rational choices to further their own self-interest, even ceding 
portions of autonomy in return for burden sharing if that arrangement is believed to 
be the optimal choice.34 The strategic benefit of international cooperation is that states 
can claim action and meet their stated political goals internally, boast of participation 
in norm-based regimes externally, and still retain power at the end of the day; this is 
evident with participation in international treaties which are non-binding. Drawing on 
the literature of norm diffusion, adoption, and adaptation of global norms is optimal 
from the vantage point of global governance regimes,35 but may not be viewed as 
such by individual states. 
 
Non-cooperation can inhibit solutions that work for all states along migration 
chains. Migration governance regimes, whether global or regional, all require the 
abdication of some degree of sovereignty. To mitigate the discomfort of sovereignty 
surrender, international organizations have included text promoting the value of 
sovereignty in their charters. Nonetheless, there are times when the value of 
Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty overrides that of international norms 
                                                 
33 Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, 13. 
34 Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, “A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control,” 
Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 2 (March 2000): 165, https://doi-org.du.idm.oclc.org/10.1177%2F0010414000033002001.  
35 Annika Björkdahl, and Kristine Höglund, “Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global–local Encounters,” Peacebuilding 1, 
no. 3 (September 2013): 289-299, https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.813170. 
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and states claim sovereignty to the shock of global governance regimes. This has been 
clearly seen in response to irregular migration in states which have voluntarily 
surrendered a portion of sovereignty for inclusion in broader governance regimes, 
only to reclaim that sovereignty when the bargain is no longer in that state’s best 
interest. In an environment where globalization has already weakened state 
autonomy, global governance regimes have the power to shift the balance of power 
between states.36 Voluntary state participation in conventions and contracts may be 
discarded by states who no longer perceive a benefit in the arrangement, which opens 
the door for coercion and imposition upon weaker states by stronger ones.37 States 
with power asymmetries facing shared migratory pressures may find themselves at 
first in cooperation revealed through voluntary self-limited sovereignty, but there will 
inevitably be tension present as a result of a power imbalance. Experts predict that 
migration management by more powerful states will set the trend for the globe.38 For 
states with a strong sovereignty ethic, this will be difficult to accept, proving the need 
for new forms of cooperation between all states along migration chains. 
 
Some hold that any stifled sovereignty is an act of self-limiting by the state 
rather than an externally imposed threat to sovereignty, as may be the case with 
                                                 
36 Jonathan Kirshner, “Globalization, Power, and Prospect,” in Globalization and National Security, ed. Jonathan Kirshner 
(New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 333. 
37 Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, 25. 
38 James Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” in Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 
ed. Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 81. 
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international human rights norms that are ultimately non-binding;39 still, others see 
such pressures as emanating from external as well as domestic forces.40 This can be 
seen by the fact that weak states are defined in large part by their inability to control 
their territorial borders.41 This should alert policymakers and human rights advocates 
to the importance of state sovereignty with relation to irregular cross-border 
movement, highlighting the value of territorial control not just to the transit states 
unable to manage movement but to the broader international community which has 
the power to ascribe ‘weak’ status to states struggling with porous borders.  
 
It is worth noting the ambiguous nature of the liberal international order 
which, on the one hand, applies pressure upon independent states to manage their 
physical territories at the risk of being labeled a weak or ‘failing’ state, while on the 
other hand doles out pressure to open the national territory to those who may possess 
humanitarian claims for protection. It is no wonder, then, that states along migration 
chains between origin and destination find their own ways to manage these signals. 
 
The changing international environment has shifted the way sovereignty is 
conceptualized. Formerly the domain of states alone, sovereignty has become more 
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intertwined with global responsibility to shared agreements and norms.42 Where 
sovereignty ends is now recognized as the point where a state is either unable or 
unwilling to protect its own citizens. This is when the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
is invoked, demonstrating that sovereignty itself is now predicated upon basic 
principles of human rights as they pertain to the population within the territorial 
border of that state.43 What is less clear is what happens when a state refuses to abide 
by international norms of responsibility on the very basis of sovereignty, as is evident 
when vulnerable migrants are denied entry. The practical relationship between 
interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty is evident with the loss of territorial 
control; under such pressure, a state may choose to compromise its Westphalian 
sovereignty.44  
 
 
1.2 Transit State Pressure and Perspective 
"Thus, transit migration is a strategic response to the constantly 
changing control regime and part of the complex interaction between 
migrants’ autonomy and states sovereignty."45 -Düvell 
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Turning attention to transit states can prove useful to security studies as it 
provides another viewpoint to understand the nation’s international agreement 
proclivities. Additionally, zeroing in on transit states can impact the humanitarian 
field as it will give depth and nuance to how and why transit states may block, detain, 
or expel travelers.  
 
Three main barriers exist which prohibit a clear understanding of transit state 
dilemmas. First is the perception that a transit state is only one of movement through 
its territory when in fact a state can be both origin, transit, and destination at the same 
time.46 Though labeling a country as a ‘transit country’ can be seen as a simplification 
of the blurred and mixed nature of migration through certain regions,47 it can also 
provide terminology to analyze the specific impacts of, and responses to, through-
migration. Conceptualizing transit migration need not take away from the challenges 
posed by emigration and immigration, but rather narrows the dialogue for deeper 
analysis of cross-border through-migration. Second, assuming that all through-
migration is undertaken by poor migrants in the global South aimed toward 
destination countries in the North is unhelpful as a majority of global movement 
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occurs intra-regionally, including within Europe itself. Indeed, research shows that 
transit migration, while highly politicized in the EU and its surrounding vicinity, is a 
phenomenon which occurs globally.48,49 Third, many governance forums conflate all 
cross-border transit migration with irregularity when in fact over half of global 
movement is undertaken within broader legal mechanisms.50,51 
 
Acknowledging these definitional challenges, this study will intentionally 
address irregular cross-border movement from a South-to-North trajectory. Migration 
assessments generally target origin or destination countries and tend to focus on 
mechanisms of integration, processing, and resettlement or the economic impact of 
the movement of people to and from these countries.52 Those which discuss notions 
of state sovereignty as it relates to irregular migration do so from the perspective of 
destination countries.53 Other assessment frameworks are deeply committed to human 
rights and, as a result, can demonize the actions of transit states looking to protect 
their international borders.  
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Transit state dilemmas are tightly related to irregular migration which is 
highly politicized and more politically than numerically significant.54 Still, transit 
migration policy is a high priority among destination countries in or around the 
European neighborhood.55,56 The EU’s failed policy in response to dramatic increases 
in refugee and asylum entries to the Schengen zone in 2015 resulted in increased 
transit through the Balkans.57 In response, Balkan countries tightened borders and 
restricted through-migration.58 Monitors report that between 2015 and 2018 at least 
800 miles of fencing has been erected along transit routes through the Balkans by at 
least 6 independent nations.59 Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece are just a few 
along the route who have participated in such wall-building, with even sympathetic 
leadership acknowledging that maintaining territorial sovereignty is their mandate.60 
The response of transit countries and the effects of re-routing migrants elsewhere in 
the Balkans shows that the policies implemented by transit states are highly important 
for migration chains overall and human security at every point along the way. There 
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is a lack of evidentiary research looking specifically at transit countries and their 
viewpoints, and even less about the effects such viewpoints may have on domestic, 
regional and international migration policy. Countries of transit have perspectives 
which shape policy and will by necessity have ramifications for other states as well as 
vulnerable travelers.  
 
Transit states have varying levels of capacity to address irregular cross-border 
entry, and those with low capacity may find themselves susceptible to international 
pressure to join migration governance regimes, especially from receiving countries in 
the North.61 It is important to distinguish between low political will and low capacity, 
as some states are willing to accept assistance and increase border monitoring efforts. 
Others, despite moderate capacity and offers of assistance, may reject parts or all of 
international migration governance mechanisms. In response to non-cooperation, 
stronger states may apply pressure on transit states to participate in international 
migration governance regimes aimed at slowing or eliminating the flow of irregular 
migrants across state borders. Pressure from migrant-receiving states (destination) 
upon migrant-sending states (origin) and those countries on the path between (transit) 
may be perceived as challenging state sovereignty. 
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Transit countries that have the capacity to invest in migration management 
regimes may choose not to do so. Rather, they may tighten borders, limit aid, and 
divert migrants away from their territory. By disengaging with the international 
migration governance regimes and ignoring calls from regional neighbors, transit 
states freeload on the international system to take care of vulnerable migrants and 
refugees before and after transit through its territory. Blocking entry to unwanted 
migrants is a form of deliberate denial which has two main components: 1) denying 
passage upholds territorial or interdependence sovereignty and 2) denying 
responsibility for migrant wellbeing, and thereby participation in global governance 
regimes, upholds Westphalian sovereignty. Both components of deliberate denial 
provide a platform for sovereignty assertion.62 In short, deliberate denial can be seen 
in political denial of the problem and tactical denial at the border.  
 
A more subtle way for a transit state to engage deliberate denial is seen in the 
decision to delegate migration enforcement authority to local agencies which then 
manage migration on behalf of the state.63 This enables the state to satisfy policy 
requirements from both internal and external stakeholders while removing itself from 
culpability in the enforcement of its own policy. This is especially important in light 
of human security where, on the front end, non-cooperative states may prevent entry 
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to irregular migrant even at the cost of denying entry and protection to those who 
would qualify for refugee or asylum status, and on the back end may expel those 
irregular migrants already present in the country, again undertaking the risk that some 
may have grounds for international protection.  
 
Successful migration governance regimes depend on cooperation among 
individual states and between states and international organizations, and transit states 
located along migration chains are key in obtaining this cooperation. Too often 
regimes undervalue the pressures on and perspectives of transit states along long 
migration chains. 
 
International organizations struggle to prevent, monitor and respond to human 
security challenges presented by irregular migration globally. This is crucial as 
international migration governance depends on the cooperation of all states along 
migration chains. Additional challenges faced by international organizations in 
managing migration include low capacity to address the drivers of migration in 
countries of origin and low will and capacity for integration in countries of 
destination. Regimes focus heavily on both countries of origin and destination with 
regard to push and pull factors. Regimes at large and international organizations 
specifically often struggle to bridge the ideological gap between state sovereignty and 
human rights norms.  
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Chapter Two | Algeria - A Transit Country in the Euro-Med Migration Crisis  
 
“Sovereignty, territorial control and state authority, then, have been 
undergoing an important reconfiguration in the EU–MENA context.”64  
 
Algeria serves as a unique case study because of its strategic position between 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and southern Europe. This places the North 
African country, the largest by land mass on the continent, in a position of tension 
regarding its border controls as it seeks to deter migrants from the south and east 
while resisting pressure from southern Europe to control migratory routes across the 
Mediterranean. More than neighboring countries along the Mediterranean coast, 
Algeria places a high value on independence and sovereignty over and above 
international cooperation, largely due to its colonial history; where Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Libya have been portrayed in a more cooperative light, Algeria is painted as aloof 
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and uninvolved in addressing irregular migration challenges. This caricature, 
however, may not be entirely accurate. This allows Algeria to serve as an appropriate 
backdrop to explore the North-South tensions surrounding state sovereignty and 
cooperation on the subject of irregular migration. Policymakers in Europe and 
throughout Africa have an interest in how Algeria handles irregular migration for 
both humanitarian and security purposes. Therefore, a heuristic case study was 
conducted with the goal of understanding one state’s approach to irregular migration 
in light of state sovereignty pressure. 
 
 
2.1 Euro-Med and Algeria Context 
 
The term ‘transit migration’ was popularized in the late 1990s by the Council 
of the European Union in response to movement through the Balkans and the 
Mediterranean, and over time came to be used synonymously with irregular 
migration.65,66 Irregular migration across the Mediterranean from North Africa to 
southern Europe has received significant media attention since it was first termed a 
‘crisis’ in 2015.67 As a result, intra-European discussions on sharing the burdens of 
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the influx of migrants has highlighted tensions between EU members. Despite 
programs which encourage cross-cutting initiatives between Europe and its southern 
neighbors in North Africa like the EUROMED Migration IV program, agreements on 
the processing of migrants both before and after reaching European shores remains a 
point of concern.68  
 
More than 144,000 migrants and refugees entered Europe in 2018, 80% of 
whom crossed the Mediterranean sea.69 Spain witnessed the most arrivals to Europe 
by sea (58,600 in 2018), with migrants departing from Morocco and Algeria.70 Use of 
the Mediterranean has been decreasing since 2016, due in large part to slow down of 
refugees from Syria. Arrivals in 2018 most commonly originated from Guinea, Syria, 
Morocco and Mali, and tend to be mostly men at 64%, followed by minors at 22% 
and women at 15%.71 Furthermore, usage between routes may be shifting from the 
Central route to the Western route, from Algeria and Morocco to Spain; despite 
intensive collaboration between the governments of Europe and the Maghreb between 
                                                 
68 ICMPD, “EUROMED Migration IV,” accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migration-
dialogues/euromed-migration-iv/. 
69 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean: Compilation of Available 
Data and Information December 2018 (DTM Flow Monitoring), accessed May 15, 2019, http://migration.iom.int/reports/europe-
%E2%80%94-mixed-migration-flows-europe-monthly-overview-december-2018?close=true.  
70 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Refugees & Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2018 
(Mediterranean),” infographic, accessed May 18, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68006.pdf. 
71 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Refugees & Migrants.” 
  
30 
 
2016 and 2017, land and sea crossings along the Western route increased 130 
percent.72 
 
Mixed migration flows through the Mediterranean corridor make it difficult to 
differentiate between those who qualify for refugee status and those who do not until 
they successfully complete the crossing. Cooperation between all Mediterranean 
states is crucial to ensuring the safe and orderly processing of asylum seekers, but 
dissension among EU states regarding the responsibility for migrant processing has 
caused not only political strain but severe danger to those making the perilous journey 
from North Africa to Europe. More and more, Europe has implemented policies of 
externalization where pressure is placed on countries bordering the EU to prevent 
migrants from crossing their territories on their way north and west.73 Many times 
safe third countries are offered aid or temporary work visas for their nationals in 
exchange for tighter border control along the periphery of Europe.74 Where deterrence 
fails, disembarkation or refusal to dock rescue ships has been a method used by 
destination countries to forcibly stop irregular migration. In North Africa specifically, 
experts believe that forcing the issue of disembarkation centers may be damaging EU-
                                                 
72 Haim Malka, Destination Maghreb: Changing Migration Patterns in North Africa (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. May 2, 2018): 6 accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/destination-maghreb. 
73 Franck Düvell, “Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicised Concept,” Population, Space and Place 18, no. 4 (October 
2010): 415, https://doi-org.du.idm.oclc.org/10.1002/psp.631. 
74 Kavita Khory, “Conclusion,” in Migration Governance: Challenges for the 21st Century, ed. Kavita Khory (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 237. 
  
31 
 
North Africa relations,75 further slowing a solution to migration policy agreement. 
Analysts agree that first, the EU must adopt a cohesive and unified migration policy 
which includes the management of controlled centers (disembarkation) along coastal 
EU states and shared relocation quotas among EU members.76 Only then can it 
approach non-member states with a comprehensive plan of action. 
 
Algeria’s neighbors have responded to attempts of EU migration 
externalization in different ways, but one thing is clear: forcing ‘partnership’ with 
North African states will be met with pushback when it is viewed as an infringement 
on sovereignty. Morocco, a transit state which serves as an embarkation point for 
many trying to reach Europe, has been suspected of purposefully allowing migrants 
and refugees to cross the Mediterranean. This suggestion, put forth by several 
regional news outlets, is defended by those who see Morocco as “trying to extort 
concessions” from its European neighbors by deliberately allowing Spain to face the 
pressure of unrestricted irregular migration.77 Some analysts believe that Morocco is 
permitting irregular migration into Spain as a bargaining ploy to increase leverage in 
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discussions with EU partners, citing the fact that Moroccan nationals made up the 
second largest group of arrivals by sea and land to the EU in 2018.78, 79 Others see 
Morocco’s continued partnership with the EU on matters of irregular migration and 
the genuine disappointment felt by Moroccan leadership when asked to host 
disembarkation centers as proof that the Kingdom should be treated as a true partner 
on par with member-states.80 Experts agree that pressure on Morocco as a transit 
point of entry to the EU will remain into the near future.81 Tunisia likewise has 
refused to disembark migrants rescued at sea, closing its ports to a search and rescue 
vessel in July 2018.82 In contrast, in 2017 the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted 20,000 
people, returning them back to detention centers in Libya.83 
 
Migration is expected to remain the political issue of the highest importance to 
Europeans regarding North Africa even though overall migration numbers have 
decreased.84 The focus of EU efforts will likely be on processing and returning or 
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integrating migrants who qualify for asylum though as of 2019 the distribution of 
asylum applications between Member states remains unbalanced. Asylum seekers 
arriving in Italy are facing a year-on-year rise in rejected asylum applications as a 
result of new hardline policy from the far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini. In 
January 2019, only 150 applications were approved compared to over 2,000 in 
January 2018.85 As a result, experts predict a rise in the number of migrants living 
irregularly in Italy, and possibly moving on to seek asylum in other EU countries. In 
2018 and for the sixth consecutive year, Germany has received the highest number of 
applications, followed by France, together amounting to 44% of all applications. 
Greece, Spain, and Italy jointly accounted for nearly 30% of all applications.86 To 
share the load, two EU resettlement schemes were initiated in response to the 
migration crisis, the first from 2015 through 2017 which saw over 27,000 individuals 
resettled, and the second from December 2017 – October of 2019 which aims to 
resettle 50,000.87  
 
While EU resettlement initiatives are managed within Europe, the IOM and 
UNHCR have proposed the establishment of predictable disembarkation and 
processing centers across the Mediterranean which are purported to combat the 
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tension among and between Mediterranean countries. Having a fair and predictable 
framework for resettlement and burden-sharing among European states will be crucial 
moving forward,88 but more work is needed in the European neighborhood. As of 
2019, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) backed by UNHCR 
is designed to ease pressure on host countries while working to find third-country 
solutions for resettlement along the Central Mediterranean route from sub-Saharan 
Africa through North Africa. Among efforts to reduce fatalities in the Mediterranean, 
the IOM and the UNHCR have called upon regional leaders to confront negative 
discourse and xenophobia.89,90 
 
The rhetoric coming from large international organizations and working 
groups may boast comprehensive approaches which address the root causes of 
migration, when in reality the force of action was firmly behind the prevention of 
migration, including the pressuring of transit and origin countries to accept aid to 
keep prevent migration to Europe.91 This externalization of migration via selective 
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outsourcing to other states is seen by those in the EU as a ‘necessary evil’,92 and by 
those in North Africa as an infringement to sovereignty.93 
 
European states formerly assumed to cooperation in international migration 
governance regimes have been accused of ‘unilateral and uncoordinated’ policy 
actions in response to mass migration.94 These actions might be described as 
sovereign decisions by states experiencing different migratory pressures, what some 
analysts see as the loss of confidence among EU member states in the ability of the 
Union to formulate a comprehensive response to the 2015 migration crisis directly 
resulted in unilateral decision-making.95 
 
Additionally, a shift in EU language from 'migration control' to 'search and 
rescue' may be a mechanism of controlling unwanted irregular migration in 
international waters, where stopping and searching vessels would otherwise be 
considered a violation of freedom of navigation under international law; this strategy 
is alluring for the EU.96  
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North Africa is a source of irregular migration to Europe and a path for many 
sub-Saharan Africans on their way to Europe. With paths to Europe increasingly 
restricted, North Africa is facing increased pressure as a destination country as well as 
one of transit.97,98 
Deep colonial scars and more recent civil war traumas have shaped the ways 
in which Algeria conceives of and plays out sovereignty at the state level. Algeria’s 
history of colonization and battle for sovereignty from invading forces date back 
centuries. The citizens of Algiers faced severe repression, taxation and brute force by 
the Ottomans from the 1500s, arguably paving the way for French takeover in 
1830.99 The ever-present threat of external domination has been built into the 
Algerian identity, layering resistance over time.100 The ouster of French rule and 
formal independence in 1962 gave the nation of Algeria its own claim to sovereignty 
hard-fought during the long and bloody war for independence which has been called 
one of “the worst colonial confrontations in history”.101  
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Losing control of its fledgling national rule was out of the question for 
Algeria’s new leadership when, as a result of political liberalization in 1989, civil war 
threatened to erupt. The adoption of democratic elections in 1992 saw a boom in 
political parties with as many as sixty by the end of 1991.102 The democratic 
opening of Algeria witnessed the formation of Islamist parties that resonated with 
Algerian nationals all over the country. Promoting conservative values and decrying 
the present state of legalized alcohol, mixed classes in schools and immodesty among 
women,103 the Algerian government was alarmed at the success of the Islamist 
parties in the first round of voting. In an effort to prevent the likely win of the Islamist 
Salvation Front (FIS), the government cancelled the second round of voting, sparking 
outcry among those who predicted a win for the FIS. Soon FIS leaders and supporters 
were arrested, demanding a return to democratic elections; but fear that the FIS could 
win and spark a civil war between those loyal to the Islamist party and the 22 million 
Algerians it would alienate as a result overrode the desire for democracy.104 
 
The crackdown by the Algerian military against armed factions loyal to the 
FIS brought bloodshed and carnage. As many as 12,000 FIS supporters were 
disappeared by Government forces claiming to fight terrorism, though often little to 
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no proof existed for those who received torture, death, or disappearance.105 This 
Dark Decade lasted through the 1990s and threatened internal unity, shared identity 
and general social stability and only ended with amnesty after an estimated 150,000 
Algerian civilians were killed by their fellow Algerians.106 A slow healing process 
began under the guidance of newly-elected President Abdelaziz Bouteflika who 
retained the presidency from 2000 until April of 2019, largely as a measure to ensure 
internal peace and stability at the price of democratic progress.   
 
More recent threats to state stability have come from extremist groups within 
and surrounding Algeria including Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the 
Islamic State (IS). Formerly more powerful in Algeria in the early 2000s, AQIM now 
pleads for its followers to not abandon Algeria as a potential stronghold.107 AQIM in 
Algeria has dwindled, possibly as a result of recruitment to IS, and calls from AQIM 
leadership for followers in Algeria to rise up have fallen on deaf ears.108 Algeria has 
responded to the threat of terrorism in two primary ways: crackdowns on weapons 
caches and small cells within the country, and increased border security. Indeed, 
securing the border is instrumental in keeping the lifeblood of the Algerian economy, 
the hydrocarbon sector, safe and operational. In addition to preventing the movement 
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of AQIM members the Algerian security forces are also highly aware of returning 
foreign fighters from war zones in the Middle East. With this in mind it is no wonder 
that the Algerian state prioritizes territorial sovereignty through border control. 
 
Until recently the porous nature of Algeria’s borders was less problematic. 
Historical movement from south to north was not considered an existential threat to 
state stability. Trade routes at the end of the 15th century transported goods from sub-
Saharan and West Africa through the cities of Agades, Takedda and Taghaza into 
what is now known as Algeria.109 Waves of migrants from North and West Africa 
entered Europe from 1921 – 1936, establishing roots and networks for later arrivals in 
the 1950s and 1960s and even greater flows after decolonization.110 Tuareg 
tribespeople and temporary workers from sub-Saharan Africa made this journey 
annually in last century and only recently have been prevented from their traditional 
movement. Ironically, this has fueled smuggling of goods and people across Algeria’s 
southern borders, incurring a strong backlash to fight ‘trafficking’ of all kinds. 
 
Algeria was chosen as the case study because it is the North African country 
with the least written about irregular migration through its territory and because it 
represents a case of a state with limited transparency, limited international and 
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regional cooperation regarding irregular migration, and a strong ethic of state 
sovereignty and non-interventionism dating from independence in 1962. These 
attributes position Algeria as an illustrative case study as they are most likely to 
demonstrate the ways in which Algeria may choose sovereignty over cooperation 
when it comes to irregular migration governance. 
 
Algeria’s administration strives for legitimacy among its own people while 
remaining nonplussed with attention from the outside world. But the outside world is 
entering Algeria, not only across the southern borders in the form of irregular 
migrants but from across the Mediterranean in the form of migration governance 
regimes. Algeria receives high marks for its ability to partake, albeit sparingly, in the 
international community while retaining and promoting sovereignty in the region. 
Internal social pressures have historically garnered a weak response from the state, 
validating its autonomy while highlighting a potentially dangerous inconsideration of 
citizen protest power.  
 
Poorly diversified, the state runs the largest bilateral deficit with the EU when 
compared to other North African states, excluding the energy sector. Resulting from 
the sharp decline in oil prices in 2014 the state enacted severe austerity measures, 
including cuts to its generous social welfare program. The cuts led to social outcry 
and protests including strikes in the education and healthcare sectors. This context 
underscores the reality within the country especially among young people, 26% of 
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whom between the ages of 16-25 in Algeria are unemployed,111 who may see migrant 
workers, whether regular or irregularly present in the country, as a threat. Graduates 
in Algeria increasingly find that university degrees are not leading to secure 
employment upon graduation.112 Though it reduced poverty levels by 20% over the 
last two decades and is making strong strides toward the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, more than one in four Algerians under the age of 30 are 
unemployed; two thirds of the country are under age 30.113 
 
Algeria is party to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) since 2003 and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since 2005, out of which was produced an 
Association Agreement which sets common goals for political and economic 
integration between Algeria and the European Union. Aside from the EU, Algeria 
remains distant from the international community at large both economically and 
politically, though strong bilateral ties to France remain as a result of colonial ties. 
Participation in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has been helpful in Algeria’s 
approach to counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking operations and may prove to be 
a platform for coordination on migration issues, though Algeria’s primary goal with 
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this partnership is border security to neutralize terrorist networks in the south of the 
country.114,115  
 
Algeria is experiencing outflows of young people of working age, many of 
whom emigrate to France either legally or illegally. Following the peace deal 
brokered by Algiers in 2015 in Mali, both countries with Mauritania and Niger 
remain members of the Sahel Regional Chief of Staff Committee, an information 
sharing body coordinated specifically to stem extremist and criminal groups from 
proliferating along the nations’ borders. 
 
Algeria has a regime-centric approach to state security which bleeds over into 
its approach to irregular migration and develops policy according to outside threats 
more than from non-state actors within its own society116. Rightly concerned about 
cross-border crime including drug and arms smuggling, Algerian authorities in the 
last several years created new militarized regions along its eastern borders. These are 
entirely focused on stopping contraband smuggling and counterterrorism along more 
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than 80 points identified between Algeria and Tunisia117. In January of 2017 Algeria 
announced a state of emergency along its Tunisian border after hundreds of Tunisian 
militants returning from conflict zones sought to cross illegally into the country118. 
This militarization of the border, while effective in stemming the flow of contraband, 
neglects the nature of cross-border migration by people fleeing desperation, and 
appears to offer no alternative but to reject all border-crossers. Those who manage to 
enter Algeria lack adequate processing and have been viewed by the state as criminals 
threatening national security. 
 
Reporting indicates that Algeria has forcefully deported over 13,000 sub-
Saharan migrants across the border to Niger in the 14 months prior to June 2018.119 
Interviews with desperate and suffering migrants, many of whom were rescued in 
dangerous desert conditions, serve to obscure the debate over sovereignty and replace 
it with a discussion of human rights. While in no way condoning the Algerian 
approach to limiting irregular migration, the root of the crisis must be interpreted as 
one of state sovereignty. 
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Within the region, Algeria’s reputation is strong as a leader in peace 
mediation with its southern neighbor Mali. It has used its strong security apparatus to 
stabilize its borders, shared by 7 countries. Government transparency is low, 
dominated by a tight circle of elites either based in or with close ties to the military. 
Transparency International gives Algeria a low score of 35/100 and ranks it 105th in 
the world in its Corruption Perceptions index.120 Algeria has a strong culture of 
peaceful protests and marches despite these being highly censored by authorities. It is 
not uncommon to see strikes, walkouts and public gatherings to vent displeasure with 
public policy, and these rarely become violent. 
 
Regional economic integration remains weak in nearly every area including 
economic, security, movement of people, political integration, and cooperation with 
the south.121Within the region, Algeria’s reputation is one of protectionism and, in 
many ways, resistance to change. Reconciling long-standing tensions with 
neighboring Morocco regarding Western Sahara and opening their shared land-border 
would be a major improvement but is not expected in the near term by international 
observers.122 Owing to its long colonial history, Algeria prefers bilateral discussions 
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regarding regional trade and security issues. The government of Algeria is semi-
democratic with strong socialist leanings. Institutions in the country are somewhat 
weak and struggle to be independent, relying heavily on the approval from the 
president; the media struggles to be independent as the government blocks 
controversial reporting and arrests journalists, only six of eighty newspapers available 
in Algiers can be considered independent in 2018.123,124  The military retains a strong 
influence over political decisions as it has since Algeria’s independence in 1962.125 
 
The movement of 100,000 Algerians by 1924 to France started the first major 
wave of labor emigration from North Africa to Europe after World War I, and the 
decade after World War II witnessed close to a quarter million North Africans move 
to France to fill labor scarcities, the majority of whom were Algerian.126 Analysts 
note that, while Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia witnessed outflows of labor during the 
late 20th century, Libya saw in inflow of migrant labor to fill jobs in the hydrocarbon, 
construction, and agriculture sectors.127 Strong diaspora ties between the countries of 
the Maghreb and Europe grew strong, born out of colonialism. The majority of 
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Algeria’s diaspora population reside in France, and while many young Algerians look 
to move abroad for job opportunities, many French-born Algerians are interested in 
returning to Algeria to re-invest in their homeland.128 The acceptance of the diaspora 
community is somewhat new, shifting from recent calls by the president against 
perceived judgement by diaspora Algerians,129 and an attempt in 2016 to significantly 
restrict the ability of dual Algerian-French citizens from serving in high office in 
Algeria. This is controversial as at least 450,000 Algerians reside in France with dual 
nationality and sense discrimination behind the policy which speaks loudly to 
Algeria’s independent self-identity.130 
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Figure 1: Algeria’s Regional Relations 
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2.2 Algeria’s Migration Context 
 
Poor coordination mechanisms between countries in North Africa on regional 
issues including migration have hampered progress toward the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals most critical for positive development in the 
region.131 Algeria has been targeted by eager EU Member states as a country with 
potential to be listed as a “safe third country” presumably as part of the broader 
policy of pushing migrants and refugees away from Europe.132 This would mean that 
there is no risk of persecution for either Algerian nationals or foreign nationals with 
respect for human rights, including that of asylum.  
 
Transit migration is undertaken by those making strategic decisions as to 
where and how they will move across international borders, a process often aided by 
migration networks which, through advice from those who have gone ahead, 
information transfer, money lending and assistance upon arrival, create self-
perpetuating cycles of migration between points.133,134 Historical movement of people 
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through North Africa shows that Algeria was used before independence by Touareg 
tribespeople from Niger looking for employment or to move their animals for 
grazing.135 Moreover, the last three decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in 
sub-Saharan African migration to and settlement in southern Algerian cities including 
Tamanrasset, Adrar and Djanet; sub-Saharan African migrants from Mali and Niger 
grew from 3,000 to over 31,000 between 1966 and 1998 in Tamanrasset alone, with 
2012 estimates showing that 20% of the Algerian Sahara now comprised of new and 
established migrants.136 Algeria has three types of refugees within the country: the 
Sahrawi in Tindouf – encamped along the border with the disputed Western Sahara – 
Palestinian refugees, and sub-Saharan refugees and asylum-seekers. Due to the 
unique and decades-long political situation governing the Sahrawi situation, this 
irregular governance assessment will not address the situation in Tindouf. 
 
Algeria’s southern border with Niger represents the ultimate clash between 
states and irregular migrants, territorial sovereignty and human rights. The southern 
region witnessed a reported 25,000 forced deportations from Algeria to Niger in 
2018. Migrants report being forced at gunpoint to walk 9 miles to the nearest 
Nigerien settlement of Assamaka with no water in temperatures reaching 104 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Many perish along the way, abandoned by their fellow travelers and 
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witnessing dead bodies parched in the sand.137 This has been corroborated by 
international human rights groups but categorically denied by the Algerian 
government, including the independent Algerian League for the Defense of Human 
Rights (LADDH).138 
 
Regional shifts have been evident following the unrest in Mali in 2012 with an 
influx of individuals crossing into Algeria in what international observers consider 
travel inconsistent with traditional migratory movement.139 Changing migration 
patterns present North African states with opportunity as well as risk; migration 
pressures are expected to increase as the African continent experiences population 
booms in sub-Saharan countries which could quadruple 2019 population estimates.140 
Africa’s youth population was estimated at 226 million in 2015, and it could rise to 
830 million by 2020.141  
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According to the UNHCR over 1,000 asylum-seekers register with the 
UNHCR office in Algiers annually and – due to increasing instability in the Sahel 
combined with more restrictive EU asylum policies – are staying in Algeria for longer 
periods of time.142 The Ministry of Interior estimated that in August 2016 that there 
were over 21,000 irregular migrants living in Algeria, while other sources claimed 
there were 30,000 in the southern wilaya (province) of Tamanrasset alone and up to 
100,000 in the country; sources for these data were not provided.143 Another source 
states that Algeria hosts roughly 100,000 migrants, the majority of whom are from 
sub-Saharan Africa, though no distinction is made between those in regular and 
irregular situations.144 
 
Some have even migrated to or through Algeria as an alternate route after 
crackdowns on people-smuggling and human trafficking in neighboring countries, 
increasing the overall numbers of irregular migrants present in the country.145,146,147 
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This indicates a shift in the path selection of irregular migrants in response to state 
policy, a topic which demands further research. Algerian Interior Ministry official in 
charge of illegal migration, Hassen Kacimi, warned in 2019 that Algeria anticipates 
receiving more irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in light of new, stricter 
European migration policies which make it more difficult to reach Europe by boat.148 
Departures from Libya have fallen thanks to increased support for the Italian 
coastguard; Italy has also helped Tunisia prevent covert departures from its 
Mediterranean shores.149 These pressures combine to push irregular migrants 
elsewhere to seek refuge, employment, or transport to Europe. 
 
Across the Middle East and North Africa over half the population is under the 
age of 24 and two-thirds are under the age of 30.150 The draw to Europe not only pulls 
sub-Saharan migrants up through North Africa but influences high numbers of 
unemployed youth across the region to emigrate as well, many of whom do so 
irregularly as ‘harragas’, taking to the sea as irregular migrants themselves.151 This 
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makes Algeria not only a transit and destination country but one of origin as well, 
complicating the migration governance debate. 
 
In response to the influx of irregular border-crossers, the Algerian government 
has been accused of detaining migrants unjustly, including Palestinian refugees.152 
Accusations by civil society organizations within Algeria report that authorities 
restricted the movement of sub-Saharan migrants in the southern wilaya of 
Tamanrasset from moving toward coastal, urban centers.153 This has been vehemently 
denied by Algerian authorities who boast that, while migrants are detained elsewhere, 
this does not occur in Algeria.154 This may be accurate, as the US State Department 
reported that as of July 2016 all four refugee camps which have been monitored by 
the Algerian Red Crescent had been closed, including its southern-most camp housing 
600 migrants near the city of Bordj Badj Mokhtar.155 Regarding expulsions for which 
there is no room for denial, Algerian authorities have in some cases claimed that these 
were approved by IOM and UNHCR, though both organizations deny approval was 
given.156 
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In addition to detainment, Algeria repatriated 27,000 individuals back to their 
home countries since 2015157 but the data distinguishing voluntary repatriation and 
forced expulsion remains murky. At least 3,000 people including asylum-seeking 
individuals have been forcefully evicted from Algeria across the Nigerien border 
since the start of 2018.158 As a result, Algeria’s repatriation agreement with Niger has 
experienced tension, as it has since 2014 when Nigerien Prime Minister urged the 
Algerian state to stop evicting non-Nigerien nationals to Niger.159 While the bilateral 
agreement allows for repatriation of Nigerien nationals, over 18,000 of whom were 
returned to Niger between 2014 and 2017, expelling non-Nigeriens under this pretext 
has caused diplomatic tension between Niger and Algeria.160 
 
Financial independence signals sovereignty. The Associated Press reports that 
“unlike Niger, Algeria takes none of the EU money intended to help with the 
migration crisis, although it did receive $111.3 million in aid from Europe between 
2014 and 2017”.161 As a point of pride, Algeria claims to have spent $20 million over 
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the last three years in response to increased irregular migration across its southern 
borders, with one official even stating that “nobody has helped us, we are handling 
the situation with our own means”.162 
 
Algeria was chosen for its sovereignty ethic, its low institutional influence, 
and its location at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. These attributes 
were considered ideal to study the potential for a transit state’s response to irregular 
migration from a position of sovereignty. To view elements of sovereignty through 
the clearest lens it was important to choose a country with a strong sovereignty 
‘ethic’, which cooperates with global governance regimes but would not be 
considered in the core group of such states, but rather the periphery. Second, it was 
important to acknowledge that policy assessments usually consider the influence of 
civil society organizations or other internal policymaking pressure. Algeria is widely 
agreed to have relatively weak institutions which struggle to be independent and are 
enmeshed heavily with the ruling elite. Because this study does not aim to consider 
public pressure within Algeria regarding migration policy, this makes Algeria a 
logical fit as there may be less civic influence toward such policymaking. Third, 
Algeria’s location on the North African coast of the Mediterranean makes it an 
obvious choice to examine North-South pressures of irregular migration. 
Furthermore, there is less policy information available on Algeria than other countries 
in the region, partly as a result of lesser migratory pressures but also because of 
                                                 
162 Chikhi, “Algeria Worried.” 
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Algeria’s resistance to broader migration governance regimes. Furthermore, Algeria 
was chosen because of its policy of deliberate denial at the border, refusing entry to 
irregular migrants while periodically expelling migrants living irregularly within the 
country.  
 
In a statement by a UNHCR spokesperson to NPR, the application of first 
legal and then normative pressure is apparent. This statement communicates not only 
Algeria's legal responsibility to provide due process to migrants but adds normative 
pressure in the form of recommended processing steps. 
 
"While UNHCR recognizes Algeria's sovereign right to adopt measures to address 
irregular migration, collective expulsions are prohibited under international law, as 
countries are required to examine each case of expulsion individually... We are calling 
on Algeria to establish, prior to deportation, whether a person could be exposed to 
serious human rights violations. If such a risk exists, Algeria is precluded from forcibly 
removing the person concerned and is required to provide access to fair and efficient 
refugee determination procedures".163  
 
Current governance assessments often attempt to tackle a comprehensive view 
of migration, including both documented and undocumented, emigration and 
immigration, economically enhancing and straining. A more targeted view on specific 
aspects of the migration puzzle may prove useful, particularly when aspects of 
migration governance concerning undocumented, irregular migration are assessed 
                                                 
163 Camila Domonoske, “AP Report: Algeria Expelling Thousands of Migrants Into Sahara, With Deadly Effect,” NPR, June 
25, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/623172244/ap-report-algeria-expelling-thousands-of-migrants-into-sahara-with-
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separately. This brief review of Algeria’s response to irregular migration purposefully 
omits data on documented economic migration and the large Algerian diaspora 
abroad for that reason. 
 
A recent study funded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
analyzed the movement of migrants in seven countries in the MENA region and 
Europe: Egypt, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Spain, and Tunisia. The North African 
country of Algeria was absent in their study. The analysis showed that sub-Saharan 
migrants traveling north through the Sahel almost always pass through the southern 
Algerian territory of Tamanrasset where they might go east to Libya or press on to 
Algiers. Once into Algeria’s north, they either apply for asylum or travel West over 
the border into Morocco and on to Europe through the Western Mediterranean route 
if possible.164 If detained, they may be returned to the southern border. Despite 
information on irregular migration in and through Algeria, this and other top-level 
studies highlight the gap in literature relating to the state’s role in the travel of 
migrants looking to reach safety, and often Europe, via Algeria. 
 
Due to the nature of irregular and undocumented migration, quantitative data 
for irregular migrants passing through Algeria is limited. For the purpose of this 
assessment, a qualitative approach will be used.  
                                                 
164 Arezo Malakooti, Migration Trends across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots (Altai Consulting for IOM MENA 
Regional Office, June 2015), accessed August 15, 2018, https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-trends-across-
mediterranean-connecting-dots.  
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Chapter Three | Methodology 
 
3.1 IOM Framework 
 
Current migration assessments fail to provide clarity regarding irregular 
migration management from state to state. Such tools either look too broadly at 
migration in all its forms or too narrowly at refugee and asylum policy. Addressing 
cross-border undocumented movement regardless of motivation can provide more 
nuance to the migration governance discussion. Furthermore, interpretation of stated 
migration policy does not do enough to capture the nuance of policymaking 
decisions.  
 
To explore the nexus of irregular migration governance and sovereignty 
within countries of transit, the researcher conducted an expert survey supplemented 
by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)’s Migration Governance 
Framework which was modified to collect data specifically on irregular migration. 
The researcher administered the survey to subject matter experts believed to have 
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knowledge of the transit country used for the case study, and their expertise was used 
for contextual nuance in addition to the policy analysis. The purpose of the study was 
to explore the intersection of irregular migration governance and state sovereignty 
concerns within a country of transit. The goal was to identify policy gaps related to 
incorrect or incomplete notions of sovereignty, recognize areas of improvement to the 
modified IOM assessment tool, and uncover valuable insights from experts on the 
context of the transit country selected for the case study.  
 
Several factors are acknowledged as important but not within the scope of this 
study. Transit migration is a gendered phenomenon with Mediterranean Sea crossings 
undertaken by only 10-11% female crossers.165 Civil society groups can hold sway 
over policymaking while host country nationals can impact the degree of integration 
for migrant families. The role of religion, both on the part of migrants as they 
determine which paths to take and on the part of host community receptiveness, may 
play a role in shaping migratory pressures and thereby migration policy. Much has 
been written about the trepidation of host states’ fear of extremist ideologies and 
returning foreign fighters as a security threat, and more could be said about the 
influence this top-down influence may have on civil society with regard to tolerance 
of migrant populations.166 The form of government of a transit state will likely 
                                                 
165 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Refugees & Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2018 
(Mediterranean),” infographic, accessed May 18, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68006.pdf. 
166 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Chapter 7: Migration, social polarization, citizenship 
and multiculturalism (Global State of Democracy, First Edition, 2017): 227, accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.idea.int/gsod/. 
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influence the nature of migration governance negotiation with supranational 
organizations; additionally, the degree to which transit states receive development aid 
or are otherwise economically enmeshed within global governance regimes may 
determine how likely they are to join migration governance regimes.  
 
Perhaps most important, the experiences of migrants along transit routes can 
reveal the successes and failures of state policy while providing invaluable nuance 
and context to the nature of irregular migration overall. Furthermore, state policy, 
especially at the border, directly impacts migrant choices/flows in transit states, 
because migrants will make rational choices to avoid authorities, and these decisions 
can be seen in vulnerable migrant choices to cross borders at more and more 
dangerous points to avoid detection. 
 
Several criticisms exist regarding the use of IOM frameworks for responding 
to global migration governance. For one, IOM is accused of politicizing mobility as 
deviant, implementing projects which directly alter the way sovereign states exercise 
authority over their territory, and even perpetuating patterns of domination by the 
global North.167 
 
 
                                                 
167 Sabine Dini, “Migration Management, Capacity Building and the Sovereignty of an African State: International 
Organization for Migration in Djibouti,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 10 (2018): 1702, 
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3.2 Setting, Participants, and Implementation 
 
An open-ended questionnaire format was chosen to collect unique views 
which may not be exposed if the survey was closed. The questionnaire was conducted 
online using the Qualtrics platform. This method was chosen to provide worldwide 
participants with maximum flexibility. The questionnaire contained 14 questions plus 
1 optional response at the end to allow the participant to reflect and share their insight 
on the nexus of state sovereignty and irregular migration may in the next 10 years, as 
well as provide practical policy advice. Participants were asked 3 questions used for 
cluster sampling, 6 questions based on the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF), 2 questions concerning human 
security, and 3 questions concerning state sovereignty. The questionnaire was 
translated into French to allow for fair sampling of experts in Europe and North 
Africa. Any responses submitted in French were translated to English prior to 
analysis. The questionnaire can be viewed in full in Annex 2. Additionally, the 
Findings provide answers for each modified IOM MiGOF question and the rationale 
for what that question was intended to uncover. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to 369 subject matter experts from the United 
States, European Union, African Union, and Algeria to obtain a geographic variety of 
perspectives. Experts from Canada and Australia were also invited. Attempts were 
made to administer the questionnaire to policymakers from non-governmental 
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organizations, government, policy thinktanks, and academic institutions to obtain 
expertise from a variety of perspectives. Attempts were made to invite participants 
from a variety of political persuasions to account for any underlying bias. Due to the 
anonymized nature of survey responses, the diversity of participants could not be 
verified. 
 
The recruitment process was via email or contact forms accessed from a 
website. Inviting experts to participate in the questionnaire was methodical with 
priority given to those specializing in one or more of the six principles and objectives 
of the IOM MiGOF: migrant rights, whole-of-government approach, migration 
partner engagement, socioeconomic wellbeing of migrants & society, mobility 
dimensions of crises, safe, orderly and regular migration. Participants were invited 
from five professions: non-governmental organization, government, academic 
institution, policy thinktank, or other. Finally, participant selection was narrowed to 
those perceived to be experts in the areas relevant to this study, specifically: irregular 
migration, migration governance, state sovereignty, or North Africa. 
 
An attempt was made to ensure an ethnically diverse response group by 
inviting participants from the united states, EU, AU, and Algeria, though data on 
ethnicity was not collected. In addition, between 1/3 and 1/2 of invited participants 
were expected to be female. On both matters of ethnicity and gender, the confidential 
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nature of the survey did not allow the researcher to identify which invited participants 
chose to respond. 
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Chapter Four | Findings 
 
4.1 Expert Participation 
 
Thirty people opened the questionnaire and 15 completed it, several of whom 
were candid that they were not familiar with policymaking mechanisms in Algeria 
specifically but could provide broad input. With a limited number of responses, a 
content analysis was conducted to identify the themes which arose for each question. 
 
There was a fairly even distribution by profession (Q1). Responses came from 
academic (5), private sector (3), consultant (3), policy thinktank (2), international 
organization (1) and government (1). No one responded from an NGO. There was a 
heavy bias in responses from an EU-centric context, with over half of participants 
operating out of Europe (8), which when combined with responses from the United 
States (5) amounted to a roughly 87% slant in the direction of a Western perspective. 
The remaining two answers were from participants operating out of Africa (1) and 
  
65 
 
North Africa (1). Responses, therefore, may skew toward a pro-EU agenda or 
mindset, whether conscious or subconscious. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Expert Participation by Theoretical Framework 
 
Two-thirds of participants selected the option defining through-migration by 
Origin, Transit, and Destination Countries (10), while less than one-third chose 
Sending, Transit, and Receiving Countries (4) as their preferred terminology. This 
indicates that most participants see cross-border movement and through-migration 
through a migrant-centric theoretical framework, using Origin, Transit, and 
Destination Countries which is assumed to be more migrant-centric vocabulary. 
 
Taken together, the three-question cluster of participant observations informed 
the way the researcher approached the remaining survey responses in three ways. 
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First, the researcher moved forward with an awareness that most participants were 
from a western context and that this may slant responses in ways which favor policies 
that benefit the EU given the regional nature of the study. Second, most participants 
preferred a migrant-centric theoretical framework for discussing international 
through-migration. This led the researcher to expect a higher rate of responses which 
mentioned policy actions or decisions which impact, either negatively or positively, 
those who travel irregularly across borders more than responses which mention the 
positive or negative effects on the states dealing with irregular migration. Third, 
understanding that roughly half of the participants operate in academic or policy 
thinktank sectors informed the researcher that responses may contain more broad 
policy rhetoric and less country-specific data, story, or nuance which may have been 
seen if more participants were from local NGOs working in or near the country of 
study. 
 
 
4.2 IOM MiGOF Policy Assessment and Expert Opinion 
 
Findings are structured according to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) and will be presented 
in a layered manner. Expert opinion was analyzed and presented according to primary 
themes upon which the policy assessment is added. The policy assessment was 
conducted from official UN reports, academic research articles, and relevant news 
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clippings. The policy assessment portion was structured by the same MiGOF 
Principles and Objectives with the aim of independently determining if Algeria meets 
the Principle or Objective proposed by IOM. This was conducted prior to the 
implementation of the questionnaire to reduce unintentional bias. Assuming that the 
case study country does not fully meet MiGOF Principles and Objectives, experts 
were asked questions which aimed to uncover what factors, if any, prevented Algeria 
from fully meeting the Principles and Objectives. 
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Figure 3: IOM Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) Principles and 
Objectives 
 
 
 
Principle 1: Adheres to international standards and fulfills migrants’ rights 
Participants were asked to identify the extent to which the absence of a formal 
asylum policy framework is the result of low political will, low government capacity, 
or something else. This question aimed to identify the root cause of the lack of formal 
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policy. Policy analysis shows Algeria clearly does not meet Principle 1 by meeting 
international standards and fulfilling migrant rights by its failure to adopt a 
standardized asylum framework. 
 
The themes revealed were strongly in favor of low political will being the root 
cause of the lack of a national asylum framework and therefore poor adherence to 
Principle 1. Many participants felt factors unrelated to low political will or low 
capacity were at play. One participant felt that increased transparency which would 
arise out of an official policy would open the country to international scrutiny and 
accountability. Another pointed out that asylum laws are uncommon in North Africa 
seeing as they are not the regional norm; migrants from Syria and Libya in Algeria 
are viewed as “brothers” and not seen as refugees. A unique regional migration 
framework with an asylum element that would match regional norms while 
improving on human rights was suggested. One participant opined that refusing to 
adopt an asylum law may be a way to hold leverage over Europe. Only one 
participant said low capacity was the primary cause, citing chronic budgetary strain. 
Final comments included the call for a change in the head of state, which was 
interpreted to mean that change must come from the top.  
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Examination of Algerian policy shows that Algeria relies on the UNHCR to 
coordinate asylum processing and aid to vulnerable groups within the country.168 
When an Algerian delegation before the Human Rights Committee was asked in July 
2018 for the projected timetable for implementing an official asylum-seeker and 
refugee act, the response centered on protecting children in vulnerable situations; the 
question remained unanswered.169 Algeria’s Office for Refugees and Stateless 
Persons (BAPRA), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains a disjointed 
institution which has still not produced a comprehensive asylum structure.170 This fact 
could support Participants who stated that political will remained the primary barrier 
to the adoption of an official asylum policy, but could also support the Participant 
who mentioned capacity as the primary barrier. 
 
Algeria is party to the most important international conventions and treaties 
governing the rights of irregular migrants, including the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol. Because of criminalization, irregular migrants have no legal 
source of income and no way to purchase food and necessities.171 However, the state 
                                                 
168 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Report 2011, (Chapter on Algeria, 147–51, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees): 147, accessed May 16, 2019, http://www.unhcr.org/4fc880ac8.pdf. 
169 “Human Rights Committee Considers the Report of Algeria.” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner (Meeting Summary, July 5, 2018), accessed May 19, 2019, 
https://ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23336&LangID=E. 
170 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Report 2011,” 147. 
171 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Report 2011,” 148. 
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does provide access to the public health system regardless of status.172 Furthermore, 
the January 2016 report to the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families affirmed Algerian denial of any 
discrimination against foreign workers whether regular or irregular. As a point of 
pride, Algeria grants migrant workers and members of their family a constitutional 
right to appeal expulsion regardless of their status.173 Rules governing police custody 
duration and rights are enshrined in law regardless of the national status of the 
detainee.174 Contradictory to Participant responses, these efforts are positive and 
indicate a desire to meet Principle 1, but can come into conflict with other legislation, 
specifically that which criminalizes irregular border-crossing. 
 
Conflict is evident between Algeria’s national and local law, as well as 
between international and national pressures. Authority can be given to the local Wali 
or governor discretion to escort irregular migrants back to the border and expel 
them.175 Although Algerian national law provides for an appeal process, local law 
appears to win out, empowering the Wali with decision-making power over irregular 
border crossing movement; indeed, appeal after forcible expulsion seems highly 
                                                 
172 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Report 2011,” 148. 
173 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights, Second Periodic Report of 
Algeria, CMW/C/DZA/2 (January 6, 2016), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/001/85/pdf/G1600185.pdf?OpenElement, ¶ 37. 
174 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of the Rights, ¶ 68. 
175 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of the Rights, ¶ 57, 216, and 320. 
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unlikely. Furthermore, a June 2008 law remains on the books which “provides for 
expulsion in situations such as unlawful entry to the country”.176 The inherent conflict 
within Algeria’s own laws governing the treatment of irregular migrants is glaring, 
not least because a provincial Wali may unwittingly be responsible for refoulement of 
would-be asylum-seekers or the forcible expulsion of persons with legitimate claims 
to asylum. Until Algeria implements a codified and adequately funded national 
asylum policy, it is unlikely to meet Principle 1 in adhering to international standards 
or fulfilling migrants’ rights. 
 
 
Principle 2: Formulates policy using evidence and a whole-of-government 
approach 
Participants were asked to examine the coherence of Algeria’s approach to 
irregular migration governance and identify the extent to which the state uses a 
whole-of-government approach in this arena. This question aimed to evaluate the 
degree of Algeria’s whole-of-government approach to irregular migration as 
perceived by experts.  
 
The themes revealed a highly complex struggle with a whole-of-government 
approach and significant barriers to coherent policy implementation. Many 
participants pointed to the nature of complexity as the reason why Algeria struggles 
                                                 
176 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of the Rights, ¶ 216. 
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with a whole-of-government approach to irregular migration. There was general 
agreement over the lack of a coherent, whole-of-government approach to managing 
migration in general, and irregular migration in particular. One participant pointed to 
the disjointed nature and diverse interests of Algerian leadership including the 
political elite, military elite, government agencies, and implementation agencies. This 
diverse range of stakeholders stalls policy creation before implementation. Other 
participants noted the poor design and implementation of migration policy itself, 
noting that overhauling Algerian migration policy threatens to upend the status quo 
by disturbing “established incomes of certain groups”, including trafficking in people 
and goods. If rolling out changes to a comprehensive migration reform package 
would threaten the livelihoods of certain groups, political ramifications may be 
enough to prevent the rollout of the policy. Finally, barriers included the lack of 
coherence within individual ministries, making coherence between ministries even 
harder. Responses containing ‘how’ elements focused on the policy of deportations, 
while responses containing ‘why’ elements centered on the sending of strong 
messages through deportations with the hope of a deterrent effect.  
 
Examination of Algerian policy confirms expert findings. Data on Algeria's 
migration and integration policies are absent from the following data collection 
sources: IMPIC, IMPALA, PICMD, ICRI, and MIPEX. This prohibits cross-
comparison between Algeria and other nations regarding their migration policies over 
time and calls into question whether the state has a coherent approach to migration. 
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Furthermore, the lack of data on migration policy as regards development, 
integration, and immigrant rights severely limits Algeria’s credibility on the indicator 
of a whole-of-government approach.  
 
Actual migration and stock data may be collected but not released publicly.177 
In its Second Periodic Report submitted to the UN’s Committee on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Algeria claims to 
both collect and use data on irregular migration for decision-making as regards the 
economic sector. While this report highlights foreign workers in an irregular situation 
– stratified by nationality and sex – it does not prove Algeria’s claim that the 
government collects, collates and processes data which is then used “to develop 
appropriate measures.”178 In contradiction, Algerian representatives who completed 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) national survey 
highlight major gaps in data collection and usage.179 This can be interpreted as a gap 
between stated policy and the actual experience of state employees who carry out the 
policy. Supporting Participants who cited high levels of complexity, this gap is 
believed to be a flaw of a complicated and technical Convention compounded with 
                                                 
177 Khalid Koser, International Migration A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 51. 
178 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of the Rights, ¶ 7. 
179 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Migration in North African Development Policies and 
Strategies: A Comparative Analysis (Office for North Africa of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (SRONA), 
2014), accessed May 16, 2019, https://www.uneca.org/publications/migration-north-african-development-policies-and-
strategies-comparative-analysis.  
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low political will and a lack of state capacity.180 Taken together it appears that there is 
no unified whole-of-government approach to collecting migrant data, irregular or 
otherwise. 
 
Regarding coordination of information, Algeria demonstrates an overall lack 
of institutional capacity and willingness to formulate a whole-of-government 
approach. In its review of Algeria’s inter-institutional coordination regarding 
migration, a report found that coordination tools between different state apparatus 
were focused on the emigration of Algerian nationals abroad. The same was found for 
coordination mechanisms between the state and civil society, where the focus was on 
improving the relationships between Algeria and nations which host Algerian 
nationals.181 No clear coordination mechanisms were reported which prioritize 
immigration to Algeria, whether regular or irregular.  
 
Diaspora concerns dominate the Algerian state’s conception of migration. 
This appears to support the general finding that Algeria tends to regard migration as 
an issue of diaspora rights and concerns rather than the concerns of those who find 
themselves on Algerian soil irregularly. Finally, a lack of interagency cooperation is 
also seen when migrants who hold an ‘exit authorization’ - permitting them to leave 
                                                 
180 Khalid Koser, “Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance,” Global Governance 16, no. 3 (Summer 
2010): 309, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29764947. 
181 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “A Comparative Analysis,” 60. 
  
76 
 
Algeria and return to their native country - are stopped in the airport and detained, 
frequently long enough to miss their flights, despite holding the necessary 
paperwork.182 Such administrative flaws show a lack of interagency cooperation 
across state apparatus. 
 
In summary, Algeria does not implement a whole of government approach to 
migration governance, much less irregular migration. Lack of political will to do an 
overhaul which would enhance interagency cooperation appears in the policy analysis 
to be the primary factor. Political will does exist for diaspora concerns, indicating 
some level of capacity. Thus, it is fair to say that Algeria does not meet Principle 2 
because we can’t see their data or practicing policy, and the government approach to 
migration appears disjointed overall. 
 
 
Principle 3: Engages with partners to address migration and related issues 
Participants were asked to reflect on the extent to which the Algerian 
government may favor cooperation with either origin/sending countries or with 
destination/receiving countries in terms of managing irregular migration. This 
question aimed to explore the nature of existing cooperation mechanisms and seeing 
if a difference could be observed between which states receive closer cooperation 
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from Algeria. The question is framed in terms of irregular cross-border migration, 
providing the participant with the choice to compare engagement with origin 
countries as compared to destination countries.  
 
The themes revealed a slight preference for cooperation with countries of 
destination over countries of origin, with other factors mentioned as influential in 
cooperation. Several participants stated that countries of destination are prioritized 
because of political and monetary relevance and because bilateral trade is a means of 
controlling migration policy, though “Algeria's stringent focus on national 
sovereignty limits the form(s) this takes”. No Participants explicitly stated that 
Algeria prioritizes cooperation with countries of origin for reasons including 1) 
Algeria’s little sway/influence over countries of destination, 2) origin countries’ low 
will to control emigration, and 3) Algeria has the will to increase cooperation with 
destination states but no firm action has been put in place. Participants also included 
the neighboring countries of transit (Mali and Niger) as countries of origin. These two 
countries are interesting in that they experience both challenges and face similar 
transit pressures while also contributing to northward migration flows. Other factors 
affecting cooperation were provided. Confronting instability in the Sahel was cited by 
Participants to affect both migrants and Algeria, confirming the interrelated nature of 
humanitarian and security concerns regarding irregular migration. Participants also 
suggest means of improving cooperation, including the adoption of comprehensive 
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legislation, improving the visa regime, regularizing entry, and the prevention and 
prosecution of trafficking and smuggling. 
 
Examination of Algerian policy shows that, regarding international 
cooperation, Algeria is considered impressive in its ability to maintain a “truly non-
aligned position in international affairs.”183 While they cooperate bilaterally and 
regionally, they strongly resist foreign influence, specifically Western or other non-
regional interference.184 Notably, Algeria engages only as an observer in one of the 
most comprehensive forums on migration in Africa, the Rabat Process. After 
deviating from its original focus on irregular migration over its first 10 years, the 
Process appears to be tackling irregular migration with renewed focus, making it a 
great time for Algeria to consider joining the group as an official member.185 This 
appears to corroborate the fact that Participants neither favored countries of origin or 
transit with regard to preferential alignment. 
 
Regarding irregular migration from a state sovereignty perspective, the most 
important aspect of cooperation involves the bilateral relationships between Algeria 
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and its border neighbors. As incompatible migration policies play out at the border, 
affecting not only human security but vital national interests, regional relationships 
are critical. Involvement with neighboring Tunisia and Mali highlight Algeria’s 
regional role. A series of border cooperation agreements in the 1990s with Mali 
(1995) and Niger (1997) preceded agreements with Italy regarding irregular migration 
(1999) and a cooperative repatriation arrangement with Nigeria (2002).186 A 2012 
border security arrangement with Tunisia allowed for the facilitation of joint patrols 
and operations, focusing on counterterrorism and stopping illegal border crossing.187 
These and similar arrangements tend to be security-heavy and based upon the premise 
that migrants bring crime, and appear to show little capacity for dealing with 
complicated mixed migratory flows.  
 
Algeria claims to have spent $20 million over the last three years in response 
to increased irregular migration across its southern borders, with one official even 
stating that “nobody has helped us, we are handling the situation with our own 
means.”188 However, recent funding by the EU Trust Fund for Africa has been spent 
in neighboring countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya) to build capacity and boost 
development, and Algeria has likely benefitted from several programs underwritten 
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by this funding despite having no national projects of its own with the Fund.189,190 
UNHCR reported in 2014 that the budget for Algeria was increased by $4.5 million 
USD to help cover the “critical needs arising from the recent decrease of bilateral aid 
programmes in the country”, although which programs were scaled back was not 
mentioned.191 
 
Finances are not the only thing which can come between an otherwise 
functioning bilateral relationship. Although Algeria ended up leading diplomatic 
mediation on behalf of the Malian government in 2014 - living out the state’s 
principle that regional neighbors should be involved in solving regional issues – Mali 
reportedly stepped back from diplomatic relations with Algeria by recalling the 
Malian ambassador and consul in response to mass deportations of non-Malian sub-
Saharan Africans across the border from Algeria.192 In corroboration, IOM reported 
receiving individuals from 9 other sub-Saharan nations in Niger in 2017, reporting 
                                                 
189 "EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Algeria Regional Projects," European Commission, accessed August 7, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/algeria_en.  
190 “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.” European Commission. Informational Summary, July 24, 2018. Accessed August 
4, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eu_emergency_trust_fund_for_africa_24-07-2018.pdf. 
191 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-15, (Chapter on Algeria, 1-6, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees): 5, accessed May 16, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/en-
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192 Anouar Boukhars, “In the Eye of the Storm: Algeria’s South and its Sahelian Borders,” in Algeria Modern: From Opacity to 
Complexity, eds. Luis Martinez and Rasmus Alenius Boserup (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 124. 
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also on their mistreatment during forced repatriation.193 Hassen Kacimi, the Interior 
Ministry official in charge of illegal migration, adamantly denied the mistreatment or 
death of irregular migrants within Algeria, rejecting these reports.194 Considering the 
resistance to external migration funding and the willingness to violate the sovereignty 
of neighboring countries through mass migrant expulsions, Algeria’s current 
approach to irregular migration appears to be weakening bilateral and regional ties in 
North Africa. 
 
Objective 1: Advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society 
Participants were asked to comment on the extent to which the Algerian state 
encourages or discourages migrant integration into society. Objective 1 speaks to the 
interplay of societal and individual migrant health. This question aimed to uncover 
the Algerian government’s stance on migration integration, assuming that integration 
of some kind would meet MiGOF Objective 1 by ‘advancing the socioeconomic 
wellbeing of migrants and society’. The question was crafted to bridge the gap 
between the wellbeing of migrants, and the wellbeing of society under the assumption 
that regularization and integration would provide 1) the necessary framework for 
migrants to live and work in compliance with government regulations, thereby 2) 
                                                 
193 “Algeria: Mass Racial Profiling Used to Deport More Than 2,000 sub-Saharan Migrants,” Amnesty International, October 
23, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/algeria-mass-racial-profiling-used-to-deport-more-than-2000-sub-
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decreasing the informal economy and allowing migrants to work and contribute to the 
economic and social wellbeing of society overall.  
 
The themes revealed three views on Algeria’s approach to migrant integration: 
ambiguous, negative and positive. Two Participants stated that Algeria’s approach to 
migrant integration overall was neutral or ambiguous. One Participant opined that it 
doesn’t really matter what Algeria’s official policy stance toward migrant integration 
may be, because migrants transiting through the country know they can bribe their 
way out of almost any situation. Participants who viewed the state discouraging 
integration identified two factors precipitating this approach: a lack of infrastructure 
and strong national security priorities. Actions taken to discourage or limit integration 
were seen as motivated by the desire to appease civil society, thus serving as a 
deterrent measure because the state does not want to be seen as willing to integrate 
and tolerate lawbreakers. Interestingly, attention to integration on grounds of national 
security was viewed in the opposite way by another participant who said the state was 
‘very engaged’ with integration. This contrast in opinions seems inconsistent but may 
corroborate the responses of those who said Algeria’s approach to integration was 
ambiguous, unclear, and fluctuates from a pro-integration approach to conducting 
mass roundups and expulsions. 
 
Examination of Algerian policy shows that the Algerian state and citizens 
generally consider refugees and asylum-seekers as ‘economic migrants’, neglecting to 
  
83 
 
distinguish lawful entry based on fear of persecution. Algerian citizens see irregular 
migrants as an economic threat in many cases, as exemplified when the short-term 
regularization of migrant workers in 2017 was met with harsh backlash from the local 
Algerian population, including mass deportations the following year.195,196 
Paradoxically, the short-term regularization was granted for irregular migrants to 
work in sectors which Algerian nationals, despite a 30% unemployment rate among 
working-age youth, could not fill.197 This indicates a lack of consistent policy, and 
highlights the risk to irregular migrants (economic, refugee or otherwise) that shifting 
policies could uproot not only their livelihoods but their very lives. This affirms 
Participant responses citing Algerian policy as ambiguous.  
 
There is a lack of transparency regarding migrant integration policy in Algeria 
with NGOs and journalists denied access to migrant centers, low transparency.198,199 
Algeria does keep records of foreign workers in an irregular situation, including 
prosecuting foreign individuals as well as employing organizations for working or 
hiring irregular migrants. The state reports “no discrimination against migrant 
                                                 
195 Jihane Ben Yahia, “Algeria’s Migration Policy Conundrum,” Institute for Security Studies, July 4, 2018, 
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workers in Algeria, whether their situation is regular or irregular,” granting them the 
right to appeal any expulsion order “even if they are undocumented or in an irregular 
situation.”200 Despite assurances, irregular migrants in Algeria face other integration 
challenges including difficulty renting homes, securing employment, and finding 
places of worship.201 Indeed, for refugees and asylum-seekers, nationals from sub-
Saharan countries are poorly integrated into Algerian society whereas their 
counterparts from Palestine and Iraq are more comprehensively integrated.202 This 
may be due to a number of factors including educational or cultural differences in 
addition to the structural flaws which relegate refugees and asylum-seekers as 
‘economic migrants’, depriving them of access to the labor market. Overall, 
integration of migrants in general within Algeria speaks to a disjointed and incoherent 
approach with leaves migrants in a situation of uncertainty. 
 
 
Objective 2: Effectively address the mobility dimensions of crises 
Participants were asked to respond to allegations that migrants move 
through Algeria in transit to Libya with the intent to cross the Mediterranean 
and to provide insight on the extent to which this movement may be a result of 
                                                 
200 United Nations General Assembly, Protection of the Rights, ¶ 40. 
201 “Country Report: Algeria,” (The Mixed Migration Hub, March 2018), accessed May 16, 201, 
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action or inaction by the Algerian state. This question aimed to explore 
Algeria’s response to cross-border movement at multiple borders to 
understand state response to crisis. 
 
The themes revealed multiple considerations for how and why migrants may 
pass through the Algerian territory, including path choice, the role of the state, and 
notions of security. The southern border is highly porous and Participants noted that 
despite deportation efforts Algeria is seen as open for irregular entry and continued 
movement onward to Morocco and Libya. This sentiment was echoed in several 
mentions of Libya as being perceived as riskier in terms of potential for capture and 
exploitation, but easier to travel through undetected from authorities. While it is 
logistically easier to travel through Libya, it is avoided due to the fear of migrant 
treatment should they be caught. One participant stated that, due to anarchic 
conditions, Libya is the default path of transit but that to avoid it requires more 
resources, flexibility, and the ability to adapt to changing factors in Algeria, which 
itself is difficult to move through. It was observed that the nature of the border being 
porous and difficult to monitor may allow for the movement of individuals into and 
back out of Algeria into neighboring countries; this was interpreted as a lack of 
capacity on the part of Algerian authorities to monitor and control its Sahelian border 
rather than a deliberate turning of a blind eye to the phenomenon.  
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Regarding the role of the state, the government in the North was claimed to be 
active in curtailing transit; second, Algeria was said to prioritize monitoring for 
terrorist groups. To this point there is a perception of heightened threat from returning 
foreign fighters from Syria, many of whom received training in or are citizens of 
North African states.203 Security was framed in several ways in participant responses: 
low human security for migrants transiting Libya; low security monitoring in Libya; 
and high security monitoring in Algeria. The cumulative effect of these three notions 
of security was described by the extra burden migrants have to  navigate between 1) 
the risks of being captured, enslaved, abused and trafficked in Libya, or 2) the risks of 
being arrested, detained, and expelled from Algeria and forced to start from square 
one. 
 
Examination of Algerian policy begins with the understanding that regional 
crises precipitate movements of people escaping violence or searching for secure 
livelihoods, making mass irregular migration across state borders a key component in 
addressing conflict and its aftermath. From a state sovereignty perspective it is agreed 
that conflict begets displacement which has adverse ramifications for states as they 
seek to protect their own nationals as well as refugees.204 As previously stated, 
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Algeria possesses no asylum policy, but instead defers to UNHCR on the ground in 
Tindouf and Algiers to process requests.205 For sub-Saharan irregular migrants who 
are detained before they can reach Algiers, the journey through southern Algeria is 
especially risky.  
 
Although former Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia publicly stated in 
2018 that deportation operations are only carried out with prior arrangements with 
neighboring countries, the evidence tells another story.206 Evidence showing the mass 
expulsion of sub-Saharan migrants into Niger over the last several years has reflected 
poorly on Algeria. Despite being party to the Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Algeria has not put into action policy 
regarding non-refoulement.207 Currently, the only recourse for irregular migrants with 
asylum claims is to be lucky enough to encounter the UNHCR at the southern 
Algerian border before deportation.208  
 
The mobility dimension of crisis includes looking deeper into the drivers of 
mass migration. In a 2016 UN review, Algeria claims to have “adopted a holistic 
                                                 
205 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-15, (Chapter on Algeria, 1-6, 
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approach under which addressing the root causes of irregular migration is 
prioritized”, though no details were provided.209 Party to the African Common 
Position on Migration and Development, Algeria has supported frameworks which 
encourage development, though it is notably removed from such implementation 
mechanisms which were developed out of the Rabat Process, since it is an observer 
only.210 Still, Middle East experts note that  
 
Algeria claims to actively cooperate with other countries in the region to 
ensure stability as it relates to their “constant mobilization of security forces all along 
its borders”; indeed, patrolling the southern border presents a “daily challenge” for 
Algeria.211 In reality all border points from Mauritania to Libya are essentially closed 
to non-military crossers as the southern region is highly securitized.212 While effective 
from a state security perspective this inevitably places vulnerable irregular migrants 
at risk by deterring them from safe crossing points. Furthermore, migrant mobility of 
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persons is not reduced by state policies prohibiting entry; rather, evidence shows that 
migrants re-route to other pathways or neighboring states.213,214  
 
Regarding Euro-Med transit, pressure from Europe to open processing centers 
for irregular migrants in Algeria evoked a strong response from then-Prime Minister 
Ahmed Ouyahia who stated that the state would “not accept the establishment of any 
such centres of this kind,” as Algeria is facing a similar crisis to Europe in terms of 
undocumented migration.215 Some have interpreted this refusal as a stand for the 
rights of migrants,216 but would be better viewed in light of state sovereignty 
assertion. In the context of state sovereignty, Algeria has the prerogative to resist 
pressure from EU in this area, but the tradeoff between sovereignty and cooperation - 
which could ease the strain of irregular migration - should be reconsidered. 
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Objective 3: Ensure that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and regular 
manner 
Participants were asked to provide insight into the degree to which the 
Algerian government balances the dual responsibilities of preventing cross-border 
criminal activity and providing asylum to qualifying applicants. This question aimed 
to explore expert views on the degree to which Algeria as a transit state can balance 
territorial security and human security. 
 
The themes revealed overall negative perceptions of Algeria’s current 
balancing of security and humanitarian responsibilities regarding cross-border 
movement. Participants decried poorly upheld migrant rights, one even going so far 
as to say the balance is shifting in favor of border security to the detriment of 
migrants. One Participant, while unable to comment on the balance within Algeria, 
did know about poor migrant rights as reported from migrants who crossed from 
Algeria into Tunisia. Regarding policy, participants wrote of Algeria neglecting its 
obligations to set up adequate policy out of lack of capacity and political will. 
Referring to highly porous southern borders, one Participant acknowledged the 
difficulty of the vast and “technically challenging” terrain as a barrier to proper 
border monitoring in general. Another stated that “there are parts in the government 
and bureaucracy that actually benefit from an open border”, though no additional 
context was provided. A small number of participants stated that Algeria manages 
this challenge moderately well. This could be a result of the distribution of 
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participants since the majority were Participants from an EU perspective who might 
view North African countries’ management through a distinctly humanitarian lens. 
 
Examination of Algerian policy shows that, as part of its highly securitized 
approach to border management, Algeria focuses heavily on stopping criminal 
activity along its border regions. Concern centers on human smuggling and 
trafficking in persons, the distinction between which is growing more difficult to 
ascertain.217 Legislation passed in 2009 criminalized human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling, both of which are now incorporated into the Criminal Code.218 While 
bundling both as crimes makes managing complex mixed migration flows simpler for 
border security forces, it can often serve to penalize victims of trafficking.  
 
Prioritizing the criminalization of cross-border smuggling can have 
unforeseen effects. Algeria has struggled not to further alienate the semi-nomadic 
tribes which, using pre-border trade routes to transport goods, have increasingly 
turned to smuggling as a source of stable income due largely to systemic 
marginalization within society.219 It may be that stemming the flow of illicit goods 
across its borders has the potential to influence regional actors who spread extremist 
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ideologies as local livelihoods are disrupted.220 A comprehensive border and 
migration policy framework would likely consider border communities in its 
approach. 
 
Former Minister of Interior Noureddine Bedoui noted that the Global 
Compact for Safe and Orderly Migration does not distinguish between irregular and 
clandestine migration.221 It could be said that ‘irregular’ migration captures the reality 
of unauthorized or illegal border crossing while ‘clandestine’ captures the same 
reality while adding a layer of deceptive intent. Further analysis on how migrants and 
host-country authorities engage with labels is required to fully unpack the importance 
of the Minister’s statement.222 For the context of this study, clandestine probably 
refers to the criminal elements of smuggling and trafficking networks and the 
exchange of money for irregular migration services. 
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Figure 4: Findings Summary 
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Chapter Five | Implications and Recommendations 
 
The Findings Summary Graphic layers the key Principle or Objective from the 
IOM MiGOF with a policy summary of Algeria’s approach to irregular migration and 
the primary barrier identified by experts. This simplification showed that the top 6 
barriers to Algeria’s full participation in the IOM Migration Governance Framework 
were less dependent than predicted upon Algeria’s self-concept of the two elements 
of sovereignty addressed by this study, interdependence and Westphalian. Rather, one 
element of sovereignty not addressed by this study, domestic sovereignty, was 
revealed to be more influential than originally predicted. A high priority on border 
security and internal social stability was evident along with generalized institutional 
disorganization. This indicates that Algeria prioritizes interdependence sovereignty 
(territorial control) and domestic sovereignty (internal social stability) more than the 
predicted Westphalian sovereignty (independence from undue political external 
influence on policymaking). By targeting migration policy toward an internal, 
domestic audience, the influence of external pressures is minimized while internal 
pressures may be more influential than previously expected. 
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The barriers to full participation in the MiGOF were as follows: Principles 1 – 
3 cited Low political will, Lack of coordination within and between government 
agencies, and Low to no cooperation with countries of origin. Objectives 1 – 3 cited 
Need to appease civil society, Securitization of a highly porous southern border, and 
Poor migrant rights as the three primary barriers to achieving IOM MiGOF 
Objectives. 
 
 
5.1 Implications for Origin and Destination Countries 
This section will look at the effects of irregular migration governance policy 
formed within the transit state of study which may or may not impact other countries 
along migration chains. To supplement the MiGOF analysis, Participants were 
specifically asked to explore effects upon origin and destination countries linked to 
Algeria by irregular migrants passing through its territory. 
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Figure 5: Policy Effects on Origin Countries 
 
Two main themes were identified as a result of the expert questionnaire 
pertaining to the effects of Algerian irregular migration governance upon countries of 
origin: political and economic ramifications. Participants identified direct effects from 
a single policy: expulsion from Algerian territory. Mass expulsions into neighboring 
countries were said to lead to diplomatic tension between Algeria and origin countries 
when these states are given no voice about their citizens being expelled from Algeria 
into a third country. Conversely, one viewpoint stated that origin countries do not 
really care about a few emigres, so the effect of Algerian migrant expulsions is 
negligible. Finally, the impact on social stress in countries receiving expelled 
migrants potentially exacerbates issues which may have led migrants to leave in the 
first place. Economic ramifications on origin countries were reported to be the loss of 
remittances and the financial and social strain arising from caring for impoverished 
and traumatized returnees. 
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Figure 6: Policy Effects on Destination Countries 
 
 
Two main themes were identified as a result of the expert questionnaire 
pertaining to the effects of Algerian irregular migration governance upon destination 
countries: clear relevance and unclear relevance of such policy for destination 
countries. Assessing the effects of Algerian irregular migration governance policy 
upon destination countries was complex for Participants. Five main policies were 
mentioned. The primary unclear effect was whether the policies implemented actually 
achieved the unstated goal of preventing onward migration to the European Union. 
Those who viewed Algeria’s migration policy implementation as clearly relevant for 
destination countries identified the EU as the primary destination, with effects also 
mentioned for Morocco and Libya. Libya was said to benefit from expulsions which 
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feed back into trafficking, while Morocco benefits from expulsions in that they 
reduce irregular entry into the Kingdom. Both neighboring countries of Morocco and 
Libya receive a positive benefit from Algeria’s migration policy of migrant expulsion 
but for very different reasons. 
 
Experts view the current nature of irregular migration through Algeria from an 
EU-centric lens, with responses indicating a high level of responsibility in Europe to 
facilitate migration governance among sub-Sahara and North African countries. 
Rationale for this position was based on the EU being the primary destination for 
many travelers, and the EU having more means to address the problem of irregular 
migration. This was justified based on the status quo of the EU ‘paying’ for North 
African states to hinder northbound migration. 
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5.2 Implications for Human Security 
 
“As countries of the Schengen zone have negotiated border control with 
the Maghreb, the vulnerability of Sub-Saharan migrants has increased in 
these areas renamed ‘transit countries’.”223 - Bredeloup 
 
The security of vulnerable migrants was a priority for experts throughout the 
questionnaire even in responses to unrelated questions, indicating a strong 
humanitarian and human security ethic present among experts. Many challenges to 
human security and their sources were identified and are summarized below. Because 
not all challenges were a direct result of state policy they are presented separately. In 
relation to the IOM Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF), the researcher 
approached the topic of human security from the belief that, if the Algerian regime 
conformed to global standards of safe, orderly and regular migration by engaging 
with shared norms of migration governance, then the human security of migrants 
would be improved as a result. The findings appear to show that more progress 
toward global norm adoption could improve the safety and security of migrants in and 
passing through Algeria.  
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Figure 7: Human Security Challenges 
 
 
The challenges identified centered around exploitation, abuse and corruption, 
and the violation of human rights and due process for irregular migrants in Algeria. 
Most of the responses targeted the Algerian government as the cause for human 
security challenges, followed by country context being inherently difficult, including 
the poor economic situation throughout Algeria, the fragility of the regime, and health 
issues.224 Abuse, exploitation, theft, crime and even violence occur at the hands of 
Algerian citizens225,226 which, when compounded with poor rule of law, leaves 
vulnerable migrants with no recourse or safety net. One participant mentioned that the 
Algerian government deliberately uses sub-Saharan migrants as “scapegoats”227 to 
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show action on “livelihood matters” to the Algerian people, but with little noticeable 
effect. This corroborates earlier findings that state action is targeted toward appeasing 
civil society. 
 
 
Figure 8: Policy Effects on Human Security 
 
 
Migrants who may have entered and worked legally in Algeria may become 
overstayers, perhaps unable to renew work permits or visas. This leads directly to the 
transition from economic contribution to society to that worker becoming ‘irregular’ 
in status, feeding in to humanitarian risk of exploitation by Algerian bosses who 
know their status. In turn, this may lead to dangerous work to pay for an even more 
perilous journey to Europe. This was an important point to the researcher as it seemed 
to encapsulate the complexity of irregular migration within Algeria, including the 
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reflection that even if Algeria seals its borders completely there will remain an 
irregular migration scenario bubbling inside. 
 
Migrant expulsions shocked the international community. Feedback from 
international human rights groups was that such actions were not legal or, if they 
were, they were highly unethical. Responses from experts represent the ambivalence 
of the international community regarding such expulsions, with some seeing as 
justified, others as justified but unethically handled, and others as never justified. 
Expulsions were justified on grounds of regional norms and historicity, as well as a 
lack of settlement infrastructure. A summary of findings is seen in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Expulsion Justification 
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Several motives for mass expulsions were provided by participants. The first 
motive was assessed as “political theater” rather than upholding law and order. The 
second motive was determined to be the belief by the ruling establishment that 
Islamic insurgents are hiding as migrants seeking asylum. The third motive was the 
desire to uphold the law and the removal of unauthorized migrants. 
 
 
 
5.3 Implications for Transit States and Algeria 
 
Experts suggested policy recommendations for Algeria moving forward. The 
majority put the responsibility on the Algerian government to more comprehensively 
manage migration to and through its territory. Using an international law-based 
approach was touted by one participant as being key for the balance of state 
sovereignty while limiting sovereign power for the sake of human rights. Findings are 
presented in three categories: Maintain Current Policy, Revise Current Policy, and 
Adopt New Policy. 
 
The majority of policy recommendations by experts suggested that revising 
current policy would be the most effective course of action. This suggests that Algeria 
is viewed to have a strong political foundation upon which to improve current policy. 
Ten separate suggestions centered on improved transparency, human rights, domestic 
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employment, and increased legal migration channels. Experts strongly suggest the 
revision of policy which deports migrants into the dessert, deprives migrants of their 
belongings, and which obscures the transparency of deportations and crackdowns. 
Additional policy revisions included working more closely with regional partners to 
counter the phenomenon of irregular migration, utilizing an international law-based 
approach, increasing legal migration channels, conducting regularization campaigns, 
and supervision of deportations by independent groups. 
 
Those in support of adopting new policy suggested tasking independent NGOs 
to supervise deportations, adopting a legal framework which would distinguish 
between trafficking and smuggling, creating facilities in the Sahara for vulnerable 
migrants, and ultimately adopting a fresh start in governance. Those in support of 
maintaining current policy pointed to carrying out due process according to Algerian 
law, continuing to exert pressure on Algeria to stop human rights violations. 
Operations including the deployment of mobile military units for controlling irregular 
cross-border movement and efforts to “pacify” the Sahara are already part of Algerian 
policy. 
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Figure 10: Expert Recommendations for Algerian Policy 
 
 
 
The way Algeria currently manages irregular migration provides several key 
policy-relevant findings and implications for the country. It was found that Algeria is 
a key player in regional border management arrangements but is hesitant to be 
enmeshed in binding regional and international migration regimes. Despite pressure 
from the EU to create a functioning asylum system such a policy step has not gained 
traction. Additionally, data collection on irregular migration remains opaque, with 
experts stating that statistics on migration from the Algerian Ministry of Defense do 
not match those of NGOs or the neighboring countries of Mali and Niger. 
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Recommendations to address these concerns were the adoption of dialogue 
which frames cooperation as a mechanism for a wider range of options, creating more 
freedom of choice for transit states. The security of irregular migrants entering 
Algeria should be couched in a way which affirms the state’s strong security focus, 
emphasizing that human security permits state security. Encouraging thorough data 
collection and sharing is recommended. 
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Figure 11: Implications for Algeria 
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Broad lessons can be applied to other transit states as a result of this study. 
Encouraging cooperation among transit states is expected to become more important 
as northward movement in the years ahead is shifting from plateaued Syrian, Iraqi 
and Afghan refugee movement to from sub-Saharan migrants as migration to Europe. 
Africa’s population is expected to double by 2050, and nearly 60% of the population 
on the continent in 2018 is under the age of 25 and highly connected through new 
communication and technology tools.228 Experts provided the following implications 
for transit states moving forward, advising policymakers to step back and consider 
what 'sovereignty’ means in the 21st century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
228 Malka, Destination Maghreb. 
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Figure 12: Broader Implications for Transit States229,230 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Luca Lixi, “After Revolution, Tunisian Migration Governance Has Changed. Has EU Policy?” Migration Policy Institute, 
October 18, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/after-revolution-tunisian-migration-governance-has-changed-has-eu-
policy. 
230 Bredeloup, “Sahara Transit,” 465. 
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Experts provided three outlook points for irregular migration through North 
Africa, the first predicting a bleak future for irregular migration in Algeria due to the 
current economic situation and upcoming political transition. The second predicted 
that the most important factor going forward to be controlling the instability in the 
Sahara, and the third predicted the nexus of poverty-, climate-, and conflict-driven 
migration which will continue into the foreseeable future. Each is discussed briefly. 
Insufficient economic development in the countries of the Sahel is predicted to 
contribute to instability among Sahel youth which has the potential to prompt 
migration flows that could affect Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Senegal, and 
Tunisia.231 While the nature and causes of climate shifts are debated among experts, 
the majority agree that famine and drought will have a significant impact. What 
remains unknown is whether communities affected by a warming world will be able 
to adapt, or whether they will be driven to move locally, regionally, or 
internationally.232 To quell the fear of states in the North who dread waves of climate-
induced migration, it is important to note that while displacement is likely, cross-
border migration is much less so, but also that movement is a form of adaptation in 
itself.233,234 
                                                 
231 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress. Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, January 2017): 164, accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-
Full-Report.pdf.  
232 Koser, A Very Short Introduction, 102. 
233 Koser, A Very Short Introduction, 103. 
234 Gregory White, “The ‘Securitization’ of Climate Induced Migration,” in Global Migration: Challenges for the 21st Century, 
ed. Kavita R. Khory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 20, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137007124. 
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Conclusion 
   
"Much will depend on how migration is managed by the more powerful 
liberal states, because they will set the trend for the rest of the globe. To 
avoid a domestic political backlash against immigration, the rights of 
migrants must be respected and states must cooperate in building an 
international migration regime." - James Hollifield235 
 
“The drivers displacing refugees and migrants — war, poverty, 
environmental factors, poor governance, human rights violations, and 
diverse fears of violence and persecution — continue to push millions 
to flee their homes across Asia and Africa.” - William Lawrence236  
 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine to what extent sovereignty concerns 
impacts Algeria’s irregular migration policy. The result of this study showed that the 
state’s irregular migration policy is less dependent on Algeria’s self-concept of state 
                                                 
235 James Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” in Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 
ed. Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 82. 
236 William Lawrence, “The EU-Arab League Summit and the African Migration Crisis,” Middle East Institute, February 22, 
2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/eu-arab-league-summit-and-african-migration-crisis. 
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sovereignty than predicted. Rather, a highly complex environment influences state 
policymaking which itself appears aimed more at a domestic than international 
audience. Expert input layered with an in-depth policy assessment shows that transit 
states are increasingly responsible for humanitarian and security outcomes.  
 
Limitations to the study included a low participant turnout for the volunteer 
survey and low transparency in Algerian migration policy. Available data on 
Algeria's migration and integration policies are absent from the following data 
collection sources: IMPIC, IMPALA, PICMD, ICRI, or MIPEX. Future research will 
endeavor to address the reason for these gaps. Furthermore, research conducted in the 
region, even that funded by the IOM, largely ignores the Algerian context.237,238 
 
Figure 13: Sources Missing Data on Algeria 
                                                 
237 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Measuring well-governed migration: The 2016 Migration Governance Index (International 
Organization for Migration, 2016), accessed May 16, 2019, http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/EIU-Migration-
Governance-Index-20160429.pdf. 
238 Malakooti, “Migration Trends.” 
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Despite the adoption of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration by more than 160 governments in December of 2018, challenges 
to the creation of a global migration data program continue effective migration 
governance overall and irregular migration governance in North Africa in particular. 
To “future-proof” migration policy,239 development in origin countries is touted as the 
most important way to prevent dangerous irregular migration under the belief that 
fighting the root cause of migration will prevent global movement,240 evidence for 
this is weak. Rather, economic differences felt within and between regions will 
increase the drive to migrate, outweighing factors of underdevelopment or poor 
governance in origin states.241  
 
Irregular cross-border migration fundamentally challenges state authority and 
capacity. Analyzing migration policy helps researchers and practitioners see how 
effective governments are at migration governance overall. The problem remains that 
current migration policy assessments attempt to accomplish too much and don’t give 
proper attention to the issue of irregular cross-border movement. Furthermore, poor 
                                                 
239 Aalborg University, “Advancing Alternative Migration Governance (ADMIGOV),” last modified October 3, 2018, accessed 
May 9, 2019, https://www.en.cgs.aau.dk/research/projects/project/advancing-alternative-migration-governance--admigov-
.cid374319. 
240 Hein de Haas, “Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration,” Development and Change 38, no. 5 
(November 2007): 828, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00435.x.  
241 Khalid Koser, International Migration A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 27. 
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assessment data available for irregular migration apart from overall migration data 
prevents the understanding of the two-way impacts of irregular migration on 
society.242 Neglecting to look at irregular migration governance independently will 
only perpetuate this gap. 
 
These findings indicate that future research should not abandon sovereignty 
concerns but rather shift to explore the effects of equalizing power asymmetries 
between states along migration chains.  Looking at transit migration through a state-
centric lens can create an equitable environment for states to engage with key 
migration policy issues, ensuring robust international institutions rebound. 
Ultimately, the way in which transit states respond to global migration flows will 
impact both national and human security.243  
 
As states wrestle with an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, 
the desire to promote freer trade will come into conflict with the need to manage 
increasing migration.244 This paradox will frame the future of migration governance 
debates into the foreseeable future though to what degree is unclear. What is clear is 
that increased cooperation with external forces, especially neighboring countries, is 
                                                 
242 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Chapter 7: Migration, social polarization, citizenship 
and multiculturalism (Global State of Democracy, First Edition, 2017): 204, accessed May 15, 2019, https://www.idea.int/gsod/.  
243 Fiona B. Adamson, “International Migration in a Globalizing World: Assessing Impacts on National Security,” in 
Globalization and National Security, ed. Jonathan Kirshner, (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 66. 
244 Hollifield, Emerging Migration, 79. 
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increasingly required to make and carry out effective border control policy.245 For 
states with a strong sovereignty ethic, it will be important to cooperate through 
international legal mechanisms which can increase options and agency for less-
cooperative states while increasing the likelihood of global norm adoption.246 
                                                 
245 Adamson, Globalizing World, 51. 
246 Tanja E. Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Sovereignty at Sea: The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in the Mare 
Liberum,” Journal of International Relations and Development 17, no. 4 (September 2014): 
446, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jird.2014.12.   
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Appendix 1: Expert Survey 
 
Questionnaire Outline 
1. Sample Clustering by Organization Type 
2. Sample Clustering by Organization Location 
3. Sample Clustering by Theoretical Framework 
4. Human Security Challenges 
5. MiGOF Objective 3 
6. Transit policy -> Origin Impact 
7. Transit policy -> Destination impact 
8. MiGOF Principle 1 
9. MiGOF Principle 2 
10. MiGOF Principle 3 
11. MiGOF Objective 1 
12. MiGOF Objective 2 
13. State Sovereignty re: Migrant Expulsion 
14. Human Security Improvement 
15. Optional: Sovereignty and Migration 
 
Questionnaire  
Question 1 
Thank you for your participation. In which type of organization do you work? 
 
Non-Governmental Organization 
Government 
Academic Institution 
Policy Thinktank 
Other 
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Please explain: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Question 2 
Where is your organization headquartered? 
 
Europe 
United States 
Africa (non-North Africa) 
North Africa (non-Algeria) 
Algeria 
Other 
 
Please explain: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 3 
There is an overall debate about the appropriate terminology to describe migration. 
Which terminology do you feel is most appropriate to describe the countries involved 
in irregular migration chains?  
 
Origin, Transit, and Destination Countries 
Sending, Transit, and Receiving Countries 
Other 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Question 4 
What are the principal challenges to the human security of migrants in or transiting 
through Algeria? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 5 
A state has multiple responsibilities concerning cross-border movement into its 
territory, including the responsibility to prevent cross-border crime like smuggling, 
and to provide asylum to qualifying applicants. To what degree does the Algerian 
government balance these responsibilities? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 6 
To what extent does the implementation of Algeria's migration policies affect 
origin/sending countries? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 7 
To what extent does the implementation of Algeria's migration policies affect 
destination/receiving countries? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 8 
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As of December 2018, Algeria does not have a national legislative asylum 
framework, despite establishing the need for such in 1963. To what extent could this 
absence be attributed to low political will, low government capacity, or something 
else? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 9 
How coherent is Algeria’s approach to migration governance? To what extent does 
Algeria manage irregular migration through a whole of government approach? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 10 
Assuming that 1) Algeria is a transit country for migrants, 2) that Algeria wishes to 
control irregular movement through its territory, and  3) that Algeria engages in 
international cooperation toward that goal: To what extent could the Algerian 
government favor cooperation with either origin/sending countries OR with 
destination/receiving countries? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 11 
To what extent does the Algerian state promote, discourage, or remain neutral 
regarding migrant integration in general? Provide examples if possible.  
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 12 
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Reports indicate that some African migrants traveling north toward the Mediterranean 
pass through southern Algeria but cross into Libya before reaching the coast, rather 
than continuing due north. Is this accurate, and if so, to what extent is this movement 
a result of action or inaction by the Algerian state? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 13 
One facet of state sovereignty is the ability of a government to regulate the movement 
of goods, capital, people and ideas across its borders, while another concerns the right 
of states to reject external pressure upon policymaking. In 2018, thousands of 
migrants were transported across the Algerian border into neighboring Niger with 
mixed international response. To what extent was the physical removal of irregular 
migrants by the Algerian government justified? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 14 
What measures could be taken to improve the human security of migrants in or 
transiting through Algeria? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
End of Survey 
 
Thank you for your participation. Your answers to the above questions will be kept 
confidential. Below you have the option to provide insight into the effects of irregular 
migration governance on state sovereignty. Your answers to this question ALONE 
may be attributed directly to you should you so desire. Please indicate you understand 
that all prior questions (questions 1 – 14) will remain confidential REGARDLESS of 
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whether you choose to complete question 15 or not. Question 15 is completely 
optional and will not affect your other responses in any way. 
 
______ Yes, please credit me for my statement on question 15. I understand questions 
1 – 14 will remain confidential. 
 
_____ No, please keep my answer to question 15 confidential like questions 1 – 14.  
 
 
Question 15 
In your opinion, what specific policy steps can be taken, and by whom, to improve 
international cooperation along migration chains through origin, transit, and 
destination countries where cooperation is resisted in the name of ‘state sovereignty’? 
What might this nexus look like in the next 10 years? 
 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
